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THE ILLUSORY PROMISE OF FREE ENTERPRISE: A 




The U.S. Census reports that Minority business ownership exceeds the 
corresponding racial makeup of U.S. demographics. Based on these figures, the 
principle of free enterprise seems to be acting on equal grounds. Could 
entrepreneurship be the social panacea for abolishing racial biases and the 
inequality gap? 
This Essay argues that this parity of Minority entrepreneurship is 
misleading. The Kauffman Foundation and Small Business Administration most 
recently reported that Black-owned firms represent only 7% of all U.S. 
businesses, Asian-owned firms represent only 4.3%, and Hispanic-owned firms 
represent only 10.6%. These businesses typically do not grow or expand, leaving 
the number of people employed by them relatively constant. Overall, minority-
owned firms experience more business failure, turnover, and job loss than 
traditional businesses. This disparity in American free enterprise is, in and of 
itself, a source of systemic racism and social injustice. 
Seemingly, American Minority entrepreneurs are given a false hope of 
economic independence. In fact, this Essay illustrates that current legal 
programs destine many of them for insolvency, bad credit, debt accumulation, 
or, at best, being rendered small and meaningless in the marketplace without 
the proper tools and opportunities to increase equity and wealth. 
The Essay concludes by proposing new legal methods to increase dedicated 
access to capital, networking, guidance, and education for racially diverse 
entrepreneurs. Specifically, it proposes relaxing bureaucracy, fixing biases in 
lending, forming racially inclusive networks, and cultivating the role of lawyers 
as social agents who can inform Minorities about impediments and 
opportunities to accumulate wealth and economic growth.  
 
 * Professor of Law, the University of Alabama School of Law and Affiliate Faculty, Center for the Study 
of Law and Religion, Emory University Law School. I am thankful to Dorothy A. Brown, Jacob Kosoff, Richard 
Delgado, Casey Faucon, Bryan Fair, Mitu Gulati, Kristin N. Johnson, Grace Soyon Lee, Alberto Lopez, Joshua 
Porter, Daiquiri J. Steele, and Dr. Christine Tyalor for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this essay. I 
thank Matt Duggan for invaluable research assistance throughout this project.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Job applicants with identical resumés, qualifications, and interview 
styles still experience different receptions, depending on their race. 
White and African American consumers still encounter different deals. 
People of color looking for housing still face discriminatory treatment 
by landlords, real estate agents, and mortgage lenders. Minority 
entrepreneurs sometimes fail to gain contracts though they are the low 
bidders, and they are sometimes refused work even after winning 
contracts. Bias, both conscious and unconscious, reflecting traditional 
and unexamined habits of thought, keeps up barriers that must come 
down if equal opportunity and nondiscrimination are ever genuinely to 
become this country’s law and practice. 
—Ruth Bader Ginsburg1 
The Minority Business Development Agency of the U.S. Department of 
Commerce paints a rosy picture of minority entrepreneurship—an astonishing 
11 million minority-owned businesses in America employ over 6.3 million 
people and generate $1.8 trillion in revenue.2 While minorities make up 23.7% 
of the U.S. population, the U.S. Census reports that minority-owned business 
enterprises account for almost 42% of all firms.3 The picture depicted from all 
accounts is quite rosy. Based on these data, free enterprise appears to be 
advancing minorities in a manner that is in accord with, or even exceeds, their 
racial distribution in society. Is entrepreneurship the remedy to the racial wealth 
disparity and inequity gap? 
A closer look at this statistical depiction reveals that, despite gains by 
minority groups in entrepreneurship, white males remain the disproportionately 
dominant entrepreneurial group by a wide margin.4 The Kauffman Foundation 
and Small Business Administration (“SBA”) reported that Black-owned firms 
represent only 7% of all U.S. businesses, Asian-owned firms represent only 
4.3%, and Hispanic-owned firms represent only 10.6%.5 The discrepancy 
 
 1 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 273–74 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 2 Who We Are, MINORITY BUS. DEV. AGENCY, https://www.mbda.gov/who-we-are/overview (last 
visited Aug. 3, 2021). 
 3 Quick Facts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/Fact/table/US/PST045219 
(last visited Aug. 3, 2021) (reporting 7,952,386 minority owned firms and 18,987,918 non-minority owned 
firms); see also EWING MARION KAUFFMAN FOUND., ZERO BARRIERS: THREE MEGA TRENDS SHAPING THE 
FUTURE OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP 1, 12 (2017), (predicting that, by 2050, more than half of the U.S. population 
will be from racial minority backgrounds). 
 4 Statistically, What Does the Average Entrepreneur Look Like?, ENTREPRENEUR https://www. 
entrepreneur.com/article/312943 (May 10, 2018) (“The stereotypical image of an entrepreneur is male and the 
data illustrate that, unfortunately, this is the case.”).  
 5 EWING MARION KAUFFMAN FOUND., KAUFFMAN COMPILATION: RESEARCH ON RACE AND 
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between these different reports lies within their definition of Minority.6 
Nonetheless, because these businesses typically do not grow, the number of 
people employed by them remains constant, and they experience frequent 
failures, turnover, and job loss.7 What contributes to differences between 
nonwhite and white-owned business entrepreneurship? 
Researchers from the Kauffman Foundation examined the connections 
between race, wealth disparity, and entrepreneurship rates.8 They concluded that 
entrepreneurs tend to be “white, male, and come from higher-income families.”9 
Family wealth was found to contribute the most to an individual’s likelihood of 
becoming an entrepreneur;10 data from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 
show that more than 80% of funding for new businesses comes from personal 
savings and friends and family.11 In 2013, the median white household held 
$141,900 in net worth, a figure approximately 13 times the median wealth of 
African American households ($11,000) and about 10 times that of Latino 
households ($13,700).12 Similarly, a Brandeis University study confirmed that 
factors such as attending college, raising children in a two-parent household, 
working full time, and spending less are likely not sufficient to reduce the racial 
wealth gap.13 The key factor that explains the wealth gap, the study noted, is that 
Whites are five times as likely as Blacks to receive substantial gifts and 
inheritances.14 This “white[] wealth advantage” and racial economic gap has 
 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP 3 (2016), https://www.kauffman.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/kauffman_compilation_ 
race_entrepreneurship.pdf. 
 6 For example, the Census data provides that “[h]ispanics may be of any race, so also are included in 
applicable race categories.” See Quick Facts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 3, n.b. The Kauffman report does 
not seem to include Hispanics with other racial groups. EWING MARION KAUFFMAN FOUND. ZERO BARRIERS, 
supra note 3, n.5. 
 7 See id. 
 8 See Emily Fetsch, Does Racial Wealth Disparity Hinder Entrepreneurship?, EWING MARION 
KAUFFMAN FOUND. (Jan. 21, 2016), https://www.kauffman.org/currents/does-racial-wealth-disparity-hinder-
entrepreneurship/ (demonstrating that entrepreneurs of color are underrepresented). 
 9 Ross Levine & Yona Rubinstein, Smart and Illicit: Who Becomes an Entrepreneur and Do They Earn 
More?, 1 (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Rsch. Working Paper, Paper No. 19276, 2013), https://www.nber.org/system/ 
files/working_papers/w19276/w19276.pdf. 
 10 Id. at 24. 
 11 Aimee Groth, Entrepreneurs Don’t Have a Special Gene for Risk—They Come from Families with 
Money, QUARTZ (July 17, 2015), https://qz.com/455109/entrepreneurs-dont-have-a-special-gene-for-risk-they-
come-from-families-with-money/. 
 12 Abbye Atkinson, Modifying Mortgage Discrimination in Consumer Bankruptcy, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 
1041, 1064 (2015). 
 13 See Groth, supra note 11 (demonstrating the connection between family wealth and entrepreneurship); 
Peter Coy, The Big Reason Whites are Richer than Blacks in America, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 8, 2017, 5:00 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-02-08/the-big-reason-whites-are-richer-than-blacks-in-
america. 
 14 Coy, supra note 13. 
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been passed down for generations and is difficult to close.15 As Professor 
Dorothy Brown put it, “[a]s in so many parts of American life, being black is 
more likely to hurt and being white is more likely to help.”16 
In a recent survey on disparities in wealth, the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System confirmed that Black and Hispanic families have 
considerably less wealth than white families, with Black families’ median and 
mean wealth comprising less than 15% of white families’ wealth.17 Asian, 
American Indian, Alaska Native, Native Hawaiian, Pacific Islander, and other 
racial group families have less wealth than white families but more wealth than 
Black and Hispanic families.18 Even among college-educated individuals, the 
racial disparities in wealth are drastic; college-educated Black people hold about 
13% of the wealth that their white counterparts hold.19 Additionally, more white 
taxpayers than black of latino taxpayers invest in the stock market.20 What is the 
nature of entrepreneurship that is exercised within this context of highly charged 
racial disparity with regard to wealth? 
Racial and ethnic minority firms (hereinafter “Minority Firms” or 
“Minority-Owned Businesses”21) promote moral and social goals that benefit 
disadvantaged populations whose main path to a livelihood and financial 
autonomy is business ownership.22 However, a troubling observation is that 
Minority-Owned Businesses are mostly one-man or one-woman businesses—
 
 15 Id. 
16 DOROTHY A. BROWN, THE WHITENESS OF WEALTH: HOW THE TAX SYSTEM IMPOVERISHES BLACK 
AMERICANS—AND HOW WE CAN FIX IT (discussing systemic racism in the U.S. Tax Code);Dorothy A. 
Brown, How the US Government Created an (Almost) Exclusively White Middle Class, LITERARY HUB (Mar. 
25, 2021), https://lithub.com/how-the-us-government-created-an-almost-exclusively-white-middle-class/.  
 17 Neil Bhutta, Andrew C. Chang, Lisa J. Dettling, Joanne W. Hsu & Julia Hewitt, Disparities in Wealth 
by Race and Ethnicity in the 2019 Survey of Consumer Finances, BD. GOVERNORS FED. RSRV. SYS. (Sept. 28, 
2020), https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/disparities-in-wealth-by-race-and-ethnicity-in-
the-2019-survey-of-consumer-finances-20200928.htm. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Khiara M. Bridges, Excavating Race-Based Disadvantage Among Class-Privileged People of Color, 
53 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 65, 81 (2018). 
20 Dorothy A. Brown, Teaching Civil Rights Through the Basic Tax Course, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 809, 819 (2010) 
(“In 2002, 9.4% of latinos, 11.7% of blacks and 35% of whites owned stocks and mutual funds.”).  
 21 The term “Minority” in this Essay alludes to minorities as characterized by the U.S. Census as any race 
and identity bunch other than non-Hispanic white. Yet, as this Essay claims, because this broad definition masks 
differences in entrepreneurial inclusion, the greater focus of the Essay is on racially diverse Minorities. It is 
worth noting that local-enterprise development, particularly of underserved communities (known as “urban 
entrepreneurship”) has “become a euphemism for “[M]inority entrepreneurship.” See Susan R. Jones, 
Supporting Urban Entrepreneurs: Law, Policy, and the Role of Lawyers in Small Business Development, 30 W. 
NEW ENG. L. REV. 71, 72–73 (2007). 
 22 See Audrey J. Murrell & Ralph Bangs, Reducing Disparities for Women and Minority Business in 
Public Contracting Work: A Call for Social Virtuousness, 10 FRONTIERS PSYCH. 1, 1–2 (2019) (calling to use 
social virtuousness for creating positive social change for historically disadvantaged minority businesses). 
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solo operations that lack real opportunities for growth.23 Entrepreneurship 
became a popular alternative means of offsetting workforce discrimination.24 
Starting a micro-business and becoming self-employed evolved into the default 
mechanism for racial and ethnic minorities (hereinafter “Minority” or 
“Minorities”25) to gain experience, training, and economic independence, and 
today, it is the principal avenue for Minorities to advance from unemployment, 
under-employment, or welfare-based income to valid work and productivity. 
Indeed, the Annual Survey of Entrepreneurs, published by the U.S. Census 
Bureau, the Kauffman Foundation, and the Minority Business Development 
Agency, notes that financial independence and economic mobility are the main 
reasons that Minorities start their own businesses.26 
However, free enterprise promises the opportunity to not only be one’s own 
boss, but also achieve scalable entrepreneurship.27 Indeed, moving up the 
economic ladder is Minorities’ main goal when starting their own businesses.28 
Entrepreneurship should not only serve as a fallback instrument for talented and 
motivated Minorities to counteract workforce discrimination and job loss but 
also provide real opportunities for expansion and growth.29 Investors and 
venture capitalists are not looking for sole practitioners but for entrepreneurs 
capable of creating profitable and booming enterprises that cultivate an 
ecosystem of their own.30 How can Minorities achieve that? 
 
 23 See SUMIYE “SUE” OBUKO & MARK PLANTING, THE STATE OF MINORITY BUSINESS ENTERPRISES: AN 
OVERVIEW OF THE 2007 SURVEY OF BUSINESS OWNERS, FISCAL YEAR (2015), https://archive.mbda.gov/page/ 
state-minority-business-enterprises-overview-2007-survey-business-owners-0.html (reporting 95% are minority-
owned lifestyle companies started by a sole proprietor (non-SGI firms)). 
 24 For a review of employment discrimination from the prisms of law and economics and Critical Race 
theories, see, e.g., Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Book Review: The Law and Economics of Critical Race 
Theory: Crossroads, Directions, and a New Critical Race Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1757, 1762 (arguing that “[i]n 
order to increase efficiency, employers have incentives to screen prospective employees for homogeneity, and, 
in order to counter racial stereotypes, nonwhite employees have incentives to demonstrate a willingness and 
capacity to assimilate”). 
 25 See supra note 21. The term “Minority entrepreneurs” in this Essay will be used hereafter to denote 
Black and Hispanic entrepreneurs. 
 26 LUCIA FOSTER & PATRICE NORMAN, THE ANNUAL SURVEY OF ENTREPRENEURS: AN INTRODUCTION 
12 n.33 (2016), https://www2.census.gov/ces/wp/2015/CES-WP-15-40.pdf.  
 27 See infra Part I. 
 28 Id.; FOSTER & NORMAN, supra note 26. 
 29 See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259, 1262 (2000) 
(pointing to the way Minorities “are often likely to perceive themselves as subject to negative 
stereotypes . . . [and] feel the need to do significant amounts of ‘extra’ identity work to counter those 
stereotypes”). 
 30 Angus Loten, For Startups, Bootstrapped Startups Risk a Lack of Connections; Financial Self-Reliance 
Can Come Back to Haunt Entrepreneurs If They Suddenly Need Investors, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 2015, at B5. 
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Our legal system imposes order and enables entrepreneurs to operate in the 
market, but it also presents Minority entrepreneurs with unusually higher 
hurdles. This Essay outlines the social and legal practices that have infused the 
free enterprise system with racial biases and doomed greater Minority 
entrepreneurs to insignificance or failure.31 Social network players, business 
lenders, and investors consider Minority entrepreneurs to be riskier because they 
lack (or are perceived as lacking) the same education, experience, and 
connections as their white counterparts.32 Even communities with high degrees 
of racial diversity can still have a narrow mindset in judging “who is 
excellent.”33 These conventions and biases have prevented Minority 
entrepreneurs from attaining equal access to networks and capital building and 
limited their access to effective integrated business networks that ultimately lead 
to financial viability.34 American Minorities have been given a false hope of 
economic independence without realistic opportunities to scale their 
entrepreneurial capacity to attain wealth and develop their communities. 
This Essay proceeds as follows: Part I discusses the importance of 
entrepreneurship to economic development and wealth mobility. It argues that 
one of the most important factors for entrepreneurial success is the ability to 
scale profitable operations, leading to spillovers into other markets, 
neighborhoods, and communities. However, as Part II demonstrates, Minority 
entrepreneurs encounter asymmetric regulatory burdens, biases in lending, and 
discrimination in capital investment that tend to contribute to high failure rates 
and predestine them to remain small and insignificant. Part III provides a primer 
to scaling racial Minority entrepreneurship and proposes several ways to remove 
current biases. It suggests creating specialized assistance programs to coach, 
train, and mentor Minority entrepreneurs, revising lending model algorithms, 
revamping microgrant and government contract programs, and cultivating the 
role of lawyers as skilled social agents who can steer racial minority 
entrepreneurs in the right direction. The Essay concludes with future inquiries 
on entrepreneurship and racial disparities. 
 
 31 See Nicole S. Dandridge, Racial Etiquette and Social Capital: Challenges Facing Black Entrepreneurs, 
32 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 471 (2010) (suggesting certain practices have “infected our free-enterprise system with 
racial bias”). 
 32 See Loten, supra note 30 (pointing to the importance of connections and introductions in the 
challenging reality that finding venture capital funding). 
 33 See Patrick S. Shin & Mitu Gulati, Cultivating Inclusion, 112 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 117, 
121 (2014); Loten, supra note 30. 
 34 Dandridge, supra note 31, at 481; ALICIA ROBB, ACCESS TO CAPITAL AMONG YOUNG FIRMS, 
MINORITY-OWNED FIRMS, WOMEN-OWNED FIRMS, AND HIGH-TECH FIRMS 2–3, 6–7 (2013), https://www.sba. 
gov/sites/default/files/files/rs403tot(2).pdf (pointing out to the difficulties for Minority-Owned Businesses to 
obtain outside capital). 
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I. THE IMPORTANCE OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP TO ECONOMIC MOBILITY 
Entrepreneurship entails the creation of new enterprises.35 But whether new 
firms are entrepreneurial depends upon their ability to convert original ideas into 
success.36 There are various manifestations of entrepreneurial success. For 
example, once an entrepreneurial firm becomes successful, it initiates mass 
production of its products or services by expanding the number of employees 
and growing its workforce.37 This growth in the firm’s economic activity often 
gives rise in income levels, scope of sales, and the return-on-assets ratio, and 
allows the entrepreneur to capitalize on this entrepreneurial prosperity by 
accumulating personal wealth.38 
A. Entrepreneurship as a Pathway to Economic and Wealth Mobility 
Free enterprise is key to facilitating market competition,39 preventing 
concentration of market power,40 eliminating large deadweight losses,41 and 
maintaining a vibrant economy.42 Today, there is general agreement among 
economists that entrepreneurship is the driving force of economic 
development.43 Empirical data indicate that entrepreneurship activity is the 
 
 35 See e.g., William B. Gartner & Nancy M. Carter, Entrepreneurial Behavior and Firm Organizing 
Processes, in ZOLTÁN J. ÁCS & DAVID B. AUDRETSCH, HANDBOOK OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP RESEARCH 195 
(2003) (defining entrepreneurship by differentiating between the creation of new organizations to maintaining 
operations of on-going organizations.). 
 36 See Joseph A. Schumpeter, Economic Theory and Entrepreneurial History, in CHANGE AND THE 
ENTREPRENEUR (1949), reprinted in JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, ESSAYS ON ENTREPRENEURS, INNOVATIONS, 
BUSINESS CYCLES, AND THE EVOLUTION OF CAPITALISM 293 (Richard V. Clemence ed., 1989) 
 37 See ZOLTÁN J. ÁCS & CATHERINE ARMINGTON, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, GEOGRAPHY, AND AMERICAN 
ECONOMIC GROWTH 16 (2006); PER DAVIDSSON, FRÉDÉRIC DELMAR & JOHAN WIKLUND, ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
AND THE GROWTH OF FIRMS 8 (2006); Zoltán J. Ács, David B. Audretsch, Pontus Braunerhjelm & Bo Carlsson, 
The Missing Link: The Knowledge Filter and Entrepreneurship in Endogenous Growth CEPR Discussion Paper 
No. 4783 (Dec. 2004), http://ssrn.com/abstract=667944. 
 38 For a literary review of these factors see Diego B. Avanzini, Designing Composite Entrepreneurship 
Indicators: An Application Using Consensus PCA 3 (June 20, 2009), in ENTREPRENEURSHIP AN ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT: DESIGNING COMPOSITE ENTREPRENEURSHIP INDICATORS ch. 3 (Wim Naudé & Palgrave 
MacMillan eds., 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1988954. 
 39 See DANIEL F. SPULBER, REGULATION AND MARKETS 138 (1989) (“[T]he possibility of competitive 
entry limits the profits of incumbent firms.”). 
 40 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 54 (2009) 
(indicating that we should strive to assure easy entry into the market). 
 41 See Douglas Gegax & Kenneth Nowotny, Competition and the Electric Utility Industry: An Evaluation, 
10 YALE J. ON REGUL. 63, 82 (1993) (stating the existence of competitors provides benefits markets). 
 42 See WILLIAM BAUMOL, THE FREE-MARKET INNOVATION MACHINE: ANALYZING THE GROWTH 
MIRACLE OF CAPITALISM 2 (2002) (“Whatever the deficiencies of the free market, it is certainly very good at 
one thing: the manufacture of economic growth.”). 
 43 See generally PETER F. DRUCKER, INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP: PRACTICE AND PRINCIPLES 
21 (1985) (pointing to entrepreneurship as driving economic growth); JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF 
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engine of economic growth, as it is strongly linked to the emergence of new 
firms—entrepreneurs form new businesses that create new jobs and increase 
productivity.44 “Entrepreneurial gains” reflect a firm’s ability to convert 
valuable resources into superior economic performance.45 When entrepreneurs 
realize success, they begin to reap “supra-competitive gains,” capital that 
emanates from new market demand.46 
Why is free enterprise a compelling solution to wealth inequality? 
Entrepreneurship is essential to achieving economic development, as it 
facilitates the formation of new businesses, creates new products and services, 
generates jobs, and fosters innovation.47 Noteworthy entrepreneurs use their 
unique talents to exploit market conditions in exceptional ways. They upend 
existing markets through disruptive innovation, creating new markets and 
combinations.48 Successful entrepreneurship yields large profits. This juncture 
opens economic opportunities for minorities to build wealth.49 It has the 
potential to narrow Minority entrepreneurs’ economic disparities, improve their 
well-being, and spillover to their neighborhoods and localities.50 
 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: AN INQUIRY INTO PROFITS, CAPITAL, CREDIT, INTEREST, AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE 
74 (Redvers Opie trans., 3d ed. 1949) (noting that entrepreneurship is the “fundamental phenomenon of 
economic development”); ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, COMPETITION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP 81 (1978) 
(“[E]ntrepreneurship is important primarily in sparking economic development.”); FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, 
UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 41 (1921) (stating that entrepreneurship has unique importance in a productive 
economy). 
 44 See, e.g., NIELS BOSMA, YANA LITOVSKY, ALICIA CODURAS & JEFF SEAMAN, GEM MANUAL: A 
REPORT ON DESIGN, DATA, AND QUALITY CONTROL OF THE GLOBAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP MONITOR 7–9 (2012), 
https://www.gemconsortium.org/report/gem-manual-design-data-and-quality-control (demonstrating the 
contribution of entrepreneurial entities to economic growth); John Haltiwanger, Ron S. Jarmin & Javier Miranda, 
Who Creates Jobs? Small Versus Large Versus Young, 95 REV. ECON. & STAT. 347, 360 (2013) (discussing how 
new entrepreneurial firms contribute to job growth). 
 45 See ALEX COAD, THE GROWTH OF FIRMS, A SURVEY OF THEORIES AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 77 
(2009).  
 46 See Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Mandating Access to Telecom and the Internet: The 
Hidden Side of Trinko, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1822, 1844 (2007) (noting supra-competitive returns allocate scarce 
network resources and provide incentives to invest). 
 47 See ZOLTÁN J. ÁCS & DAVID B. AUDRETSCH, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGICAL 
CHANGE 1 (2005) (demonstrating that entrepreneurship drives economic growth because entrepreneurs create 
new businesses, and new businesses, in turn, create jobs and increase productivity through technological 
change). But see ALGERNON AUSTIN, THE COLOR OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP: WHY THE RACIAL GAP AMONG FIRMS 
COSTS THE U.S. BILLIONS 4, 19–20 (2016) http://globalpolicysolutions.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Color-
of-Entrepreneurship-report-final.pdf (claiming free enterprise and encouraging minority entrepreneurship are 
not by themselves sufficient in promoting wealth equality). 
 48 See supra notes 42–46 and accompanying text. 
 49 FOSTER & NORMAN, supra note 26, at 3. 
 50 See MIKE KONCZAL & MARSHALL STEINBAUM, DECLINING ENTREPRENEURSHIP, LABOR MOBILITY, 
AND BUSINESS DYNAMISM: A DEMAND-SIDE APPROACH 1–2 (2016), http://rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2016/07/Declining-Entrepreneurship-Labor-Mobility-and-Business-Dynamism-A-Demand-Side-
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B. Expansion as an Important Ingredient of Successful Entrepreneurship 
In the past, creating a new firm in itself was considered an entrepreneurial 
act, and the entry of new firms has thus become a well-accepted measure of 
economic wealth. Undeniably, new organizations are perceived as a means 
through which entrepreneurs transform resources into final goods. Yet, most 
scholars distinguish between simply creating a firm and achieving profitability 
and success.51 They point to scaling entrepreneurship and expansion as key to 
leveraging business operations into financial prosperity.52 Entrepreneurial firms 
are portrayed as the largest contributors to economic growth because of their 
effect on labor expansion: 
How is entrepreneurship good for economic growth? This question 
would seem to have a simple answer: Entrepreneurs create new 
businesses, and new businesses in turn create jobs, intensify 
competition, and may even increase productivity through 
technological change. High measured levels of entrepreneurship will 
thus translate directly into high levels of economic growth.53 
One of the most recognized positive effects of successful entrepreneurial 
firms is when they expand their economic activity, which manifests as a rise in 
income levels, growth in sales, increase in revenues, or surge in assets.54 
Thereafter, successful firms grow their workforce, contributing to job creation 
and economic growth.55 Such indicators of increased economic performance are 
immediate proxies for entrepreneurial success because they signal the ability of 
firms to provide superior products or services.56 This form of economic wealth 
from entrepreneurial firms can then be transferred to the entrepreneur’s personal 
assets and capital. 
 
Approach.pdf (arguing that slack labor markets and entrepreneurship explain the fall in job switching and a 
decline in geographic mobility). 
 51 See generally Mirit Eyal-Cohen, The Cost of Inexperience, 69 ALA. L. REV. 859, 872–80 (2018) 
(reviewing the literature and pointing out the effect of scale, scope, and age on the innovative nature of the firm). 
 52 See Mirit Eyal-Cohen, Through the Lens of Innovation, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 951, 963 (2016) (arguing 
firms “invest a high proportion of their income in knowledge procurement in the hope of deriving profits and 
expanding their labor force”). 
 53 Zoltán Ács, How Is Entrepreneurship Good for Economic Growth?, 1 INNOVATIONS: TECH., 
GOVERNANCE, GLOBALIZATION 97, 97 (2006). 
 54 See, e.g., John Williamson, Profit, Growth and Sales Maximization, 33 ECONOMICA 1, 1–2 (1966) 
(providing a model that measures the differences in firm behavior driven by sales maximization). 
 55 See DAVIDSSON ET AL., supra note 37 (exploring job growth factors). 
 56 See, e.g., id.; David J. Bryce & Jeffrey H. Dyer, Strategies to Crack Well-Guarded Markets, 85 HARV. 
BUS. REV. 84, 84 (2007) (pointing out the correlation between firm growth change in average annual sales). 
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Still, the principle of free enterprise alone is not a guarantee of achieving 
economic independence and improving wealth parity. There are differences 
between various types of entrepreneurship. Economist Zoltán Ács differentiates 
between “necessity entrepreneurs”—who act because of the lack of other 
employment options—and “opportunity entrepreneurs”—who start a new 
enterprise to exploit a business opportunity.57 Only opportunity entrepreneurship 
has a positive and significant effect on economic development and should be 
combined with the economic power of established corporations.58 
Most Minority Firms today exist as necessity entrepreneurship primarily to 
provide a means of support for the owners and their families.59 They operate 
mostly on local, geographically driven demand and fill market niches.60 
Minority-Owned Businesses tend to focus on personal service and the 
availability of local goods while building their reputation,61 although some firms 
are formed to act as franchised agents or subcontractors of larger firms.62 To 
some extent, they improve market diversity and regional revitalization.63 
Community economic development and poverty alleviation are social 
imperatives to every functioning society. Yet, achieving these objectives 
requires a macroeconomic perspective focused on changes within and among 
groups of people.64 Entrepreneurship has the capacity to achieve such goals. It 
can lift entrepreneurs and their employees out of poverty and introduce a suitable 
alternative to government welfare and income-substitute programs.65 However, 
this depends fundamentally on the assumption that entrepreneurs will leverage 
 
 57 See Ács, supra note 53. 
 58 Id. at 97, 104; see also Zoltán J. Ács, “Entrepreneurial Capitalism” in Capitalist Development: Toward 
a Synthesis of Capitalist Development and the “Economy as a Whole”, in ENTREPRENEURSHIP, GROWTH, AND 
PUBLIC POLICY 319 (Zoltan J. Ács, David B. Audretsch & Robert J. Strom eds., 2009). 
 59 See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 60 See Rafael Efrat, Minority Entrepreneurs in Bankruptcy, 15 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 95, 100, 
102 (2008). 
 61 Rohit Arora, Examining the Funding Challenges for Black-Owned Businesses on Juneteenth, FORBES 
(June 18, 2020, 10:14 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/rohitarora/2020/06/18/examining-the-funding-challenges—
for-black-owned-businesses-on-juneteenth/?sh=66e6d6027af0. 
 62 See Buck Brown, New Owners of Franchises Belie Mom-and-Pop Image, WALL ST. J., Aug. 29, 1988, 
at 11 (arguing that during the 1990s there was a shift in franchising toward more-sophisticated buyers with 
proven business skills and deep pockets). 
 63 See generally Rashmi Dyal-Chand & James V. Rowan, Developing Capabilities, Not Entrepreneurs: 
A New Theory for Community Economic Development, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 839, 842 (2014). 
 64 Id. at 842–43; see Dana Thompson, L3Cs: An Innovative Choice for Urban Entrepreneurs and Urban 
Revitalization, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 115, 116 (2012). 
 65 See Stephanie Rugolo, Increasing Entrepreneurship Is a Key to Lowering Poverty Rates, GOLDWATER 
INST. (Oct. 29, 2014), https://goldwaterinstitute.org/article/increasing-entrepreneurship-is-a-key-to-lowering-2/. 
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their success and potential for high growth into regional and national economies 
by producing goods or services that are in high demand.66 
To summarize, entrepreneurship should not only serve as a default 
mechanism for capable Minorities to respond to labor and employment 
discrimination, but also deliver genuine opportunities for economic 
development and wealth growth. Unfortunately, even though entrepreneurship 
can potentially narrow wealth inequalities, currently these inequalities represent 
a major impediment for Minorities to attaining entrepreneurial success and 
expansion, as discussed in the next Part.67 
II. BARRIERS TO CULTIVATING MINORITY ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
Entrepreneurship is a useful means that, if managed correctly, can narrow 
the wealth gap and provide opportunities for Minority entrepreneurs to 
overcome inequality.68 Moreover, ensuring equal opportunity for all will allow 
more Minority-Owned Businesses to contribute even further to the American 
economy.69 Although reports point to increasing numbers of Minority-Owned 
Businesses,70 past and present biases present hurdles to sustaining these firms 
and improving their economic status. 
As is demonstrated in this Part, current legal arrangements and government 
programs are filled with exclusionary policies and systemic racial inequality. 
Complex procedures and unfair practices exacerbate failure, bad credit, and 
debt—factors that contribute to expanding the wealth gap and increasing 
economic disparity for Minorities. They compel Minority Firms to remain small 
and insignificant in the marketplace. Consequently, these biases increase social 
injustice and expand the divergence in the quality of life and social mobility 
between these groups and the rest of society. 
A. Failure and Insolvency 
The risk of failure and its adverse legal consequences constantly threaten 
businesspeople. The legal system plays a key role in dictating the effects of 
 
 66 See Alicia Alvarez, Lawyers, Organizers, and Workers: Collaboration and Conflict in Worker 
Cooperative Development, 24 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 353, 353 (2017) (“Entrepreneurship has been the 
centerpiece of community economic development’s poverty alleviation efforts.”). 
 67 See Lynnise E. Phillips Pantin, The Wealth Gap and the Racial Disparities in the Startup Ecosystem, 
62 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 419, 422, 424–26, 428 (2018). 
 68 Id. at 419, 423–24. 
 69 See AUSTIN, supra note 47 (discussing ways to promote equal opportunity for Minorities). 
 70 See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
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entrepreneurial failure.71 Financial accountability outcomes that are too harsh 
can discourage entrepreneurs from assuming new risks or entering the market.72 
However, because of idiosyncratic structures and procedures, Minority 
entrepreneurial failure can happen more often and have much larger 
consequences. Accordingly, funding applications, lending practices, and 
insolvency procedures play important parts in increasing uncertainty and 
impeding minority entrepreneurship. 
Indeed, scholars have historically maintained that the business failure 
experienced by Black entrepreneurs is notably higher than that of their 
counterparts.73 Black individuals experience a twofold higher rate of 
unemployment, have significantly lower personal and family incomes to rely on, 
are three times more likely to live in poverty, and possess only one-fifth of the 
net worth of whites.74 Accordingly, the higher failure rates of Minority-Owned 
Businesses compared to those of their white cohort have been correlated to 
limited access to capital, difficulties raising money, and the accumulation of 
large debts within the marketplace.75 
The legal significance of bankruptcy procedures is that they provide debtors 
with a chance to discharge debt and attain a fresh economic start.76 However, 
prior business failures make it almost impossible for Minority entrepreneurs to 
obtain credit or new funding, even through Minority-designated lending 
programs.77 For Minority entrepreneurs, the concept of bankruptcy’s fresh start 
hardly ever transpires in reality.78 They feel they are penalized too harshly for 
 
 71 See Seung-Hyun Lee, Yasuhiro Yamakawa & Mike W. Peng, Entrepreneurship and the Barrier to 
Exit: How Does an Entrepreneur-Friendly Bankruptcy Law Affect Entrepreneurship Development at a Societal 
Level? 9 (SBA, Working Paper No. SBAHQ-06-M-0536, 2008), http://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/7372321.pdf 
(pointing to the correlation between entrepreneurship and bankruptcy rates). 
 72 See D. Gordon Smith & Darian M. Ibrahim, Law and Entrepreneurial Opportunities, 98 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1533, 1536 (2013) (“[L]imited liability and asset partitioning—reduce the costs of entrepreneurial action 
and failure, thus emboldening entrepreneurs to exploit opportunities.”). 
 73 See Jones, supra note 21, at 74–75. 
 74 See W. Sherman Rogers, The Black Quest for Economic Liberty: Legal, Historical, and Related 
Considerations, 48 HOW. L.J. 1, 10 (2004) (reviewing the history of Black entrepreneurs). 
 75 See, e.g., Hannah Knowles, Number of Working Black Business Owners Falls 40 Percent, Far More 
Than Other Groups Amid Coronavirus, WASH. POST (May 25, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost. 
com/business/2020/05/25/black-minority-business-owners-coronavirus/ (“[M]inority-owned businesses have 
suffered disproportionately in a crisis that’s also killing nonwhite Americans at higher rates and eliminating 
more of their jobs.”). 
 76 See generally DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 30–59 (6th ed. 2014). 
 77 For example, to be able to qualify for 8(a) SBA government contract program the Minority entrepreneur 
needs to be in “good standing.” What are the basic requirements a concern must meet for the 8(a) BD program?, 
76 Fed. Reg. 8,254 (Feb. 11, 2011) (codified at 13 C.F.R. § 124.101). 
 78 See PHILIP J. ADELMAN & ALAN M. MARKS, ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCE: FINANCE FOR SMALL 
BUSINESS 162–63 (1998) (pointing to hurdles in establishment of line of credit to protect against cash flow 
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their errors and overwhelmed by many vague rules and standards.79 For instance, 
one of the requirements for admission to the 8(a) Business Development 
program is that the business be controlled by “one or more socially and 
economically disadvantaged individuals,”80 a broad and unclear standard. 
Furthermore, in some Minority communities, there is a strong social aversion 
and shame associated with bankruptcy filing.81 
Nevertheless, an empirical study on bankruptcy petitioners in California 
found that contrary to what had been hypothesized, Minority entrepreneurs were 
not overrepresented in the bankruptcy population.82 A plausible explanation for 
this underrepresentation may be the lack of access to formal debt financing and 
inadequate access to professional financial advice.83 In the said California 
bankruptcy study, Minority bankruptcy petitioners were found to have less 
access to financial capital, fewer accumulated assets, fewer ties to financial 
institutions, and a higher lending rejection rate.84 The reliance on private 
resources and self-financing serves as modern redlining practice and an 
inevitable reality for Minority entrepreneurs compelled by their lack of access 
to debt financing.85 Consequently, Minority entrepreneurs who were in the midst 
of bankruptcy procedures were found to be more financially fragile than their 
non-Minority counterparts, with substantially lower equity cushion or levels of 
income and assets.86 
 
deficiencies). 
 79 See, e.g., John M. Czarnetzky, Time, Uncertainty, and the Law of Corporate Reorganizations, 67 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2939, 2980–81 (1999) (generally arguing bankruptcy rules are not useful in the 
entrepreneurial context). 
 80 13 CFR § 124.101 (2020). 
 81 See Efrat, supra note 60, at 122. Furthermore, Minorities in bankruptcy procedures report different 
experiences than their White counterparts. See Pamela Foohey, Lender Discrimination, Black Churches, and 
Bankruptcy, 54 HOUS. L. REV. 1079, 1098 (2017) (“[i]t appears that some attorneys steer their Black clients to 
Chapter 13 while counseling similarly situated white clients to file under Chapter 7. Attorneys’ responses to an 
experimental vignette designed by Jean Braucher, Dov Cohen, and Robert Lawless to ascertain how attorneys 
guide a debtor toward a particular bankruptcy Chapter revealed that, on average, attorneys seemed to want Black 
clients to “earn” their bankruptcy discharge.”).  
 82 Id. at 121–22 (demonstrating that, counterintuitively, minority business owners are not overrepresented 
in the bankruptcy sample). 
 83 Id. at 123–24. 
 84 Id. at 100 (containing research data obtained in 2005 and 2006 from surveys completed by bankruptcy 
petitioners in the Central District of California San Fernando Valley Division). 
 85 See Alicia M. Robb & Robert W. Fairlie, Access to Financial Capital Among U.S. Businesses: The 
Case of African American Firms, 613 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI., 47, 49, 60, 63, 65 (2007) (discussing 
issues in self-financing and performance of Black-owned business). 
 86 See, e.g., Rory Van Loo, A Tale of Two Debtors: Bankruptcy Disparities by Race, 72 ALA. L. REV. 
231, 232–33 (2009) (reviewing the disparate impact of race on bankruptcy outcomes). 
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Minority entrepreneurs disproportionately under-participate in bankruptcy 
proceedings also because they rely heavily on unregulated or informal lending.87 
Credit and banking practices can shed light on this phenomenon. Scholars have 
claimed that the effects of the segregated debt market are still felt today in both 
the regulated banking industry and the unregulated credit industry.88 For 
instance, Black neighborhoods have been described as “banking deserts,” with 
93% of all banks closings occurring in low-income minority neighborhoods 
while payday lenders and title lenders take over the credit void.89 As they have 
been left out of the mainstream banking system, the Black community 
historically has been either unbanked or under-banked, thus leaving them with 
the extremely costly unregulated credit industry.90 
Indeed, legal scholars Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein pointed out that 
Black and Hispanic borrowers pay, higher loan fees than white borrowers.91 
Additionally, mainstream banks provide fewer loans to borrowers in Black 
neighborhoods than to borrowers in white ones and deny more mortgage 
applications from minority zip codes.92 Accordingly, the Black community is 
more than twice as likely as any other race to use payday loans.93 Not 
surprisingly, Blacks are more likely to be sued by debt collectors, and the 
number of debt collection judgments is five times higher in Black neighborhoods 
than in white neighborhoods.94 Such studies have long established that racial 
minorities have fewer assets and opportunities to accumulate wealth and are thus 
less able to financially ascend and mobilize. They simply are not fortunate 
enough to have a buffer against life’s hardships and are more exposed to 
financial shocks, aggressive collection, debt and insolvency pressures, eviction, 
and legal action.95 These trends can shed light on why, despite the increase in 
 
 87 See Jesse P. Houchens, Comment, Minority Entrepreneurs and Fast Failure, 32 BYU J. PUB. L. 257, 
280 (2018) (arguing Minority businesses are subject to discriminatory practices that contributed to their higher 
failure rates). 
 88 See Mehrsa Baradaran, Jim Crow Credit, 9 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 887, 887–88, 939 (2019) (challenging 
a long-standing banking myth that small community banking and microfinance are the answer for marginalized 
communities). 
 89 Id. at 939. 
 90 See Testimony of Mehrsa Baradaran Before the U.S. S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Cmty. Affs. 2–3 
(2019), https://www.banking.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Baradaran%20Testimony%207-30-19.pdf. 
 91 RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, 
AND HAPPINESS 136 (2008). 
 92 See Peter Eavis, Race Strongly Influences Mortgage Lending in St. Louis, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 19, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/19/business/dealbook/race-strongly-influences-mortgage-
lending-in-st-louis-study-finds.html. 
 93 Baradaran, supra note 88, at 939. 
 94 Id. at 939–40. 
 95 Id. at 940. 
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the number of Minority business owners, the racial wealth gap and inequality 
keep expanding. 
Alas, legal initiatives to change these practices, such as the Financial 
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, have been 
unsuccessful. The Act aimed to preserve and increase the number of 
“[M]inority-owned banks” by providing technical assistance, training, and 
educational programs to prevent insolvency.96 Under the Act, banking and 
federal agencies (such as the FDIC) were to increase their support for Minority-
owned or Minority-controlled banks through grants and programs and encourage 
deposits in such institutions.97 However, scholars have criticized that in the 
absence of a clear mandate, these federal agencies have not established adequate 
formal processes.98 They were not consistent in their policies and decisions but 
rather acted on a case-by-case basis.99 Lastly, such agencies took the role and 
acted to educate, guide, and train Minority banks, rather than their Minority 
borrowers.100 
B. High Interest Rates and Limited Funding Opportunities 
As demonstrated above, the rate of entrepreneurship among people of color 
is on the rise, driven mainly by their desire for financial independence and 
economic mobility.101 However, all Minority entrepreneurs do not experience 
the same outcomes.102 High interest rates and limited funding opportunities 
contribute to this disparity. Indeed, the SBA reported that Minority-Owned 
Businesses typically have lower loan approval rates than small white-owned 
businesses.103 
Minority entrepreneurs who are fortunate enough to obtain loans to operate 
their businesses tend to rely on high-cost capital that represents a burden on their 
finances and hinders their business growth.104  The SBA pointed out that 
Minority entrepreneurs are considered riskier in terms of the likelihood of 
 
 96 Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), Pub. L. 101-73, 
§ 308, 103 Stat. 183, 353 (1989). 
 97 See Baradaran, supra note 88, at 940–41. 
 98 See id. at 941. 
 99 See id. 
 100 Id. 
 101 See FOSTER & NORMAN, supra note 26, at 3–4. 
 102 Pantin, supra note 67, at 428. 
 103 See Houchens, supra note 87, at 283–84. 
 104 See David G. Blanchflower, Phillip B. Levine & David J. Zimmerman, Discrimination in the Small-
Business Credit Market, 85 REV. ECON. & STAT. 930, 930 (2003) (demonstrating that Black, Hispanic, and Asian 
firm owners pay higher interest rates and are often denied financing). 
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repayment compared to their white counterparts because there is generally more 
information available about the latter.105 Minority entrepreneurs often lack 
managerial experience, regulatory knowledge, and assets level, increasing their 
default exposure in the eyes of creditors.106 Such systemic bias in lending is 
devastating to Minority entrepreneurs, as they lack the economic cushion other 
entrepreneurs bring from home.107 
Moreover, private investment in Minority entrepreneurship is scarce. 
Stockholders, investors, and venture capitalists seek to invest in entrepreneurial 
firms with potential to make supra-competitive profits that will change their 
environments.108 Businesses that start from strong financial positions are more 
likely to be able to scale up and adapt to challenges. As noted, Minority 
entrepreneurs lack access to capital, which for many Americans, is created 
through homeownership and family assets, which historically been rife with 
discrimination.109 Accordingly, they start small and stay small; their lack of 
home-based capital hinders them from attracting investment capital.110 
One such illustration of this Catch-22 is apparent in crowdfunding 
investment. In theory, crowdfunding was meant to be an inclusive system that 
enables entrepreneurs, regardless of their age, origin, appearance, or 
geographical location, to utilize social networks and the internet to obtain 
capital.111 Moreover, it was designed to allow companies that are considered 
 
 105 See Houchens, supra note 87, at 284. 
 106 Efrat, supra note 60, at 95. 
 107 See Alicia Robb, Access to Capital Among Young Firms, Minority-Owned Firms, Women-Owned 
Firms, and High-Tech Firms 4–5 (SBA, Working Paper No. SBAHQ-11-M-0203, 2013), https://www.sba.gov/ 
sites/default/files/files/rs403tot(2).pdf (“[M]uch of the financial capital used to start businesses comes from the 
owners themselves.”). 
 108 See, e.g., Andrew Wong, Angel Finance: The Other Venture Capital, in VENTURE CAPITAL 71, 73 
(Douglas Cumming ed., 2010) (noting angel investors in many cases restrict limit their investments to firms 
within a three-hour drive from home). 
 109 See Michael P. Seng, Restorative Justice: A Model for Conciliating Fair Housing Disputes, 21 J. L. 
Society 63, 69-70 (2021) (describing the history of discrimination and restrictive racial covenants on residential 
properties). 
 110 EWING MARION KAUFFMAN FOUND., STATE OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP, ZERO BARRIERS: THREE MEGA 
TRENDS SHAPING THE FUTURE OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP 3 (2017), https://www.kauffman.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2019/12/state_of_entrepreneurship_address_report_2017.pdf (“[I]f minorities started and owned businesses at 
the same rate as non-minorities do, the United States would have more than 1 million additional employer 
businesses and approximately an extra 9.5 million jobs in the economy.”). But see C. Steven Bradford, 
Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 104 (2012) 
(“Crowdfunding . . . gives poorer entrepreneurs whose friends and family lack the wealth to provide seed capital 
somewhere else to turn.”). 
 111 See, e.g., Andrew A. Schwartz, The Gatekeepers of Crowdfunding, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 885 (2018) 
(providing an empirical analysis of the two core policy goals of securities crowdfunding inclusivity and 
efficiency). 
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riskier to solicit retail investors to make investments, which were traditionally 
offered solely to accredited (wealthy) investors. However, crowdfunding 
platforms that curate and select the companies they list focus mainly on 
establishing their reputation as a reliable market for investors than on market 
inclusivity.112 Minority business owners without family ties and affluent friends 
have difficulties employing crowdfunding successfully and kickstarting interest 
in their projects. Their constricted access to capital and networking effectively 
blocks them from pulling in capital from the public.113 
To summarize, the high cost of capital and limited access to funding may 
elucidate why the increase in the number of Minority-Owned Businesses does 
not match with their degree of financial viability.114 Indeed, Census Bureau data 
indicate that the quantity of business receipts belonging to Black-owned 
businesses remains far lower than their share of businesses.115 The sales of the 
average Black-led business remained minuscule, while the ratio of the average 
sales of businesses headed by white Americans rose.116 Minority-Owned 
Businesses are less profitable than comparable white-owned firms, earning just 
0.3% of total business receipts.117 The share of U.S. private sector employment 
in African American-led businesses has remained very small, at around 1%.118 
While the average size of majority-owned businesses amounts to $2.3 million in 
annual revenue, the average size of Minority-Owned Businesses is only $1.6 
million.119 Moreover, non-Minorities are twice as likely as Minorities to own 
employer businesses in the U.S., and Black entrepreneurs are almost three times 
more likely than whites to have profits negatively impacted by access to 
 
 112 Id. at 921 (pointing to the need to consciously trade off inclusivity and efficiency in crowdfunding). 
 113 See HABIB JAMAL, CROWDFUND CAP. ADVISORS, CROWDFUNDING’S POTENTIAL FOR MINORITY AND 
WOMEN OWNED ENTERPRISES (2014), https://www.scribd.com/document/235308665/Crowdfunding-s-
Potential-for-Minority-and-Women-Owned-Enterprises (describing the low rate of businesses funded by women 
and Minorities). 
 114 See Scott Shane, More African-Americans Are Becoming Entrepreneurs, But Gap Remains, SMALL 
BIZ TRENDS (Nov. 2, 2015), https://smallbiztrends.com/2015/11/african-american-entrepreneurs-survey.html 
(noting that the number of Minority-Owned Businesses rose from 7.1% in 2007 to 9.4% in 2012). 
 115 STATE OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP, supra note 110. 
 116 Shane, supra note 114 (“In 2012, the average non-employer headed by a white American had sales of 
$50,900, while that of the average non-employer headed by an African-American had sales of $19,000.”). 
 117 Serious Help May Be on the Way for America’s Black Entrepreneurs, Will Banks and Biden Start to 
Level the Playing Field?, ECONOMIST (Dec. 12, 2020), https://www.economist.com/united-states/2020/12/12/ 
serious-help-may-be-on-the-way-for-americas-black-entrepreneurs. 
 118 Survey of Business Owners (SBO) – Survey Results: 2012, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Feb. 23, 2016), 
https://www.census.gov/library/publications/2012/econ/2012-sbo.html; Shane, supra note 114 (“The average 
non-employer business headed by a [w]hite American is 2.7 times larger than the average non-employer business 
headed by an African-American.”); see Fetsch, supra note 8, at 11. 
 119 Fetsch, supra note 8, at 14; STATE OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP, supra note 110, at 14. 
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capital.120 Another factor that contributes to such trends is the uniquely higher 
regulatory barriers Minority entrepreneurs encounter as portrayed next. 
C. Asymmetric Regulatory Burdens 
The government promulgates regulations to correct market inefficiencies 
associated with promoting social welfare in areas such as workplace safety, 
environment, immigration, etc.121 Complying with these regulations can be very 
costly.122 Rules and procedures represent a system of knowledge about who 
might take action and under what certain circumstances.123 For example, there 
are regulatory costs imposed for new administrative filings in addition to 
disclosure requirements for existing processes and recordkeeping necessary to 
comply with current rules.124 In its most recent Information Collection Budget, 
the Office of Management and Budget reported that the public spends 11.4 
billion hours annually responding to federal information collection requests 
stemming from paperwork requirements.125 Most of these compliance costs are 
fixed, regardless of the entity’s income level. They come at the expense of time 
and money not spent on alternative, more productive business opportunities.126 
Operating within a regulated environment, entrepreneurs incur indirect 
informational costs to learn, interpret, and comply with the requirements of law 
and regulations. “Written . . . by lawyers for lawyers,” regulations are often 
multifaceted and extremely convoluted for business owners to comprehend.127 
Entities must understand a significant body of regulations to determine what 
rules apply and how to avoid noncompliance. Regulatory costs fluctuate 
according to the manager’s education and background, the entity’s products and 
services, and other industrial and financial conditions.128 Entrepreneurs’ ability 
 
 120 STATE OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP, supra note 110, at 17. 
 121 See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity & Ruth Ruttenberg, Counting the Cost of Health, Safety and 
Environmental Regulation, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1997, 1998–2000 (2002) (providing an empirical review of 
regulatory impact analyses). 
 122 Eyal-Cohen, supra note 51, at 861. 
 123 Id. at 866. 
 124 See, e.g., C. Steven Bradford, Does Size Matter? An Economic Analysis of Small Business Exemptions 
from Regulation, 8 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 1, 8 (2004) (discussing the effect of administrative 
requirements on small business). 
 125 OFF. MGMT. & BUDGET, INFORMATION COLLECTION BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT 2 (2017), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/icb_2017-FINAL-1.pdf. 
 126 See, e.g., William J. Baumol & J. Gregory Sidak, The Pricing of Inputs Sold to Competitors: Rejoinder 
and Epilogue, 12 YALE J. ON REGUL. 177, 185 (1995) (defining opportunity costs from regulation). 
 127 Eyal-Cohen, supra note 51, at 882 (citation omitted). 
 128 See, e.g., Serguey Braguinsky, Steven Klepper & Atsushi Ohyama, High-Tech Entrepreneurship, 55 
J.L. & ECON. 869, 881 (2012) (pointing to the level of education of entrepreneurs regarding regulatory 
compliance). 
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to mitigate new and existing regulatory burdens is a function of their industrial 
maturity, knowledge, and market familiarity. This kind of “economics of 
experience” includes knowledge about not only regulations, but also production 
processes, market structure, marketing methods, distribution channels, retailer 
relationships, etc.129 Although obtaining market information is a calculated cost, 
the literature has largely overlooked the distributive effects of regulatory 
knowledge on Minorities. 
In this context of regulatory burdens, the lack of “economies of experience” 
has a regressive distributional impact on Minority entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs’ 
age and level of education greatly affect their ability to defray regulatory 
costs.130 The more time they have to become informed and well-versed about 
their market and become acquainted with its landscape, the better they are 
positioned to defray such gathering and processing informational costs and adapt 
to changes in regulations or new rules. Alas, as the Kauffman Firm Survey 
reports, Minority entrepreneurs are often younger, hold fewer college and 
graduate degrees, have less general work experience, and possess significantly 
less net wealth than their white counterparts:131 
Source: Office of Advocacy, U.S. Small Business Administration132 
Evidently, Minority entrepreneurs lack economies of experience and do not 
operate on the same level playing field.133 Lacking the same levels of education 
and experience as their counterparts, Minority entrepreneurs may face a difficult 
 
 129 Eyal-Cohen, supra note 51, at 871 (defining economies of experience and pointing to the regressive 
effects of regulatory costs on newcomers and entities that lack economies of experience). 
 130 See Braguinsky et al., supra note 128, at 881 (pointing to the important effects of the education level 
of entrepreneurs). 
 131 ROBB, supra note 34, at 11. 
 132 Id. at tbl.2. 
 133 Id. (including an SBA study demonstrating minority entrepreneurs have lower business education, 
college degrees, and managerial experience). 
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choice between two undesirable options. On the one hand, the Minority 
entrepreneur can choose to go into business without the same education and 
connections and thus be disadvantaged as a business owner. Or alternatively, 
they may choose to get the education and experiences they need before starting 
their own business. But this option may be prohibitively expensive since 
Minorities also tend to have less wealth and lower incomes than non-Minorities. 
Minorities often are not paid at the rate of non-Minorities, so taking the time to 
gain additional experience or pay others for such knowledge may end up putting 
Minorities in an even more precarious financial state when they start the 
business.134 
Being short of marketplace familiarity and formal postsecondary education 
puts Minorities at a major disadvantage compared to those who already possess 
knowledge, industrial maturity, and regulatory understanding. They incur higher 
informational and learning costs when obtaining licenses, importing goods, 
hiring employees, and handling financial transactions.135 As time passes, 
developing practices and putting monitoring systems into place to stay informed 
of regulatory changes also require them to spend greater time and money. 
Moreover, because most Minority Firms are small, they face disadvantages 
related to economies of scale and their inability to spread such fixed costs over 
a larger output.136 
When Minority entrepreneurs—overwhelmed by trying to obtain capital, 
develop their product, and penetrate their market—face bureaucratic processes 
and complex procedures, they experience more unnecessary delays, high 
penalties, and prohibitive costs.137 For example, more Minority business owners 
have described the government procurement process as unbearably complex and 
lengthy.138 A study reported that minority business owners spent an average of 
 
 134 See Nicole Dieker, Why the Racial Wealth Gap Exists, and What You Can Do About It, HAVEN LIFE 
(July 10, 2020), https://havenlife.com/blog/racial-wealth-gap/. See also Dorothy A. Brown, Three Ways Tax 
Policies Increase the Black-White Racial Wealth Gap, PROMARKET (May 18, 2021), https://promarket.org/ 
2021/05/18/taxes-increase-racial-wealth-gap-america-inheritance/ (noting Black college graduates are 40% 
likely to have graduate school debt compared to 22% for their white peers). 
 135 See, e.g., MICHAEL PARKIN, MELANIE POWELL & KENT MATTHEWS, ECONOMICS (2003) (pointing to 
the effect of licensing regulations on entrepreneurship). 
 136 See B. Peter Pashigian, A Theory of Prevention and Legal Defense with an Application to the Legal 
Costs of Companies, 25 J.L. & ECON. 247, 261 (1982) (demonstrating empirically economies of scale in legal 
costs of top 750 Fortune companies). 
 137 See Mary K. Olson, Explaining Regulatory Behavior in the FDA: Political Control vs. Agency 
Discretion, in 7 ADVANCES IN THE STUDY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 71, 73 
(Gary D. Libecap ed., 1996) (arguing excessive compliance barriers pose threats to the development of 
businesses). 
 138 See Stephen Clowney, Invisible Businessman: Undermining Black Enterprise with Land Use Rules, 
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1.7 years (20 months) and 6.1 unsuccessful bids before they were able to secure 
a federal contract, while it took the average non-Minority contractor only 1.3 
years (16 months) and 4.4 unsuccessful bids.139 The Urban Institute in 1996 
found that Minority-Owned Businesses receive just fifty-seven cents of every 
dollar from government contracts expected to be allocated to them based on firm 
availability.140 
Furthermore, the asymmetrical distribution of regulatory costs affects 
Minority Firms more intensely, thus creating significant hurdles that reduce their 
competitive position. Minority entities that cannot easily mitigate these 
regulatory outlays are forced to sell their products at suboptimal prices leading 
either to stagnation or death in the long run. In extreme cases, the economic 
effect of certain regulations can be so immense as to hamper and inhibit Minority 
entrepreneurs from entering the market at all.141 
Lastly, costs are not solely borne by a regulated entity, as they also affect 
other stakeholders dealing with the entity, such as vendors, customers, and 
employees in the form of inferior payments, higher prices, and lower 
compensation, respectively.142 The ability to mitigate regulatory transaction 
costs has significant implications. These costs of obtaining information, 
studying rules, and conforming with business regulations may or may not be 
able to pass to other parties. “Incidence theory” identifies which constituents are 
affected by changes in the firm’s costs.143 We have limited data about the 
incidence of regulatory costs and allocation of such costs because they mostly 
 
2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1061, 1065 (2009) (arguing that zoning regulations impress unique and disproportionate 
harms on African American merchants). 
 139 See Chris Burrell, Disparities in Government Contracting Hurt Minority-Owned Businesses, NPR 
(Feb. 20, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/02/20/807126443/disparities-in-government-contracting-
hurt-minority-owned-businesses; MARÍA E. ENCHAUTEGUI, MICHAEL FIX, PAMELA LOPREST, SARAH C. VON DER 
LIPPE & DOUGLAS WISSOKER, DO MINORITY OWNED BUSINESSES GET A FAIR SHARE OF GOVERNMENT 
CONTRACTS? (1997), https://www.urban.org/research/publication/do-minority-owned-businesses-get-fair-share-
government-contracts. 
 140 See id. 
 141 See Christoph Müller & André Nijsen, Development of an RIA Coordination with a Focus on SME and 
Start-Ups, in BUSINESS REGULATION AND PUBLIC POLICY 282 (A. Nijsen, John Hudson, Christoph Müller, Kees 
van Paridon & R. Thurik eds., 2009) (defining “irritation costs” as “the effect of regulation hindering the 
entrepreneur at the highest degree in his activities”). 
 142 See, e.g., Arnold C. Harberger, The Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax, 70 J. POL. ECON. 215 
(1962) (discussing the incidence of corporate tax). 
 143 See, e.g., Ian W.H. Parry, Hilary Sigman, Margaret Walls & Roberton C. Williams III, The Incidence 
of Pollution Control Policies, in THE INTERNATIONAL YEARBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND RESOURCE 
ECONOMICS 2006/2007, at 19 (Tom Tietenberg & Henk Folmer eds., 2006) (arguing that low-income households 
bear a disproportionate share of the costs of environmental regulation). 
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involve private undisclosed dealings.144 However, assuming that many Minority 
Firms’ customers and employees are Minorities themselves dictates that the 
government plays a key role in placing an asymmetric distribution of regulatory 
costs on Minority Firms’ patrons and workers. Such uneven cost allocation result 
in a loss to society145 when Minority entrepreneurs forgo actions that cultivate 
economic growth, racial diversity, and social mobility.146 
To conclude, for those who possess it, economies of experience in terms of 
age, scope, and scale of operations increases their ability to defray costs 
associated with the production or distribution process. Accordingly, having 
lower levels of personal wealth, educational knowledge, and marketplace 
experience places Minority entrepreneurs and their firms at a disadvantage 
compared to majority-owned firms, who possess more information, exposure, 
and connections.147 These hurdles may have contributed to establishing long-
term majority-owned firms’ dominance. They also distress the nature of 
Minority business communities and neighborhoods.148 The next Part attempts to 
remedy such systemic inequalities and distributional asymmetries Minority 
entrepreneurs and their firms face throughout their various venturing stages. 
III. A PRIMER TO PROMOTING MINORITY ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
Minority entrepreneurs are at a disadvantage by having limited opportunities 
to obtain capital, facing asymmetric regulatory burdens, and having an increased 
likelihood of failure. Accordingly, this Part proposes new approaches to 
alleviate these systemic effects on Minority entrepreneurs. It suggests utilizing 
collaborative mechanisms to provide coaching and mentoring, increasing 
dedicated Minority capital and lending, and establishing information-sharing 
networks between peers. Lastly, it emphasizes the role of legal agents in 
empowering Minority entrepreneurs’ success. 
 
 144 Eyal-Cohen, supra note 51, at 896–97 (“[While] it is challenging to measure the effect of an entire 
regulatory system, . . . it is worthwhile to consider the potential incidence of regulation on a cohort of regulated 
and unregulated affiliates, even if measuring it is cumbersome.”). 
 145 For the definition of “social loss” see Daniel J. Gifford, The Antitrust State-Action Doctrine After Fisher 
v. Berkeley, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1257, 1295–96 (1986) (describing “social loss” as what “would have been 
produced or sold in a competitive market but that are not produced because of the anticompetitive effects of the 
law of a state or a political subdivision thereof”). 
 146 On the effect of regulation on society, see D. Bruce La Pierre, Political Accountability in the National 
Political Process—The Alternative to Judicial Review of Federalism Issues, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 577, 648 (1985). 
 147 Timothy Bates, William E. Jackson III & James H. Johnson Jr., Advancing Research on Minority 
Entrepreneurship, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 10, 10 (2007). 
 148 See Houchens, supra note 87, at 280. 
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A. Minority Regulatory Flexibility 
One solution to the problems faced by Minority entrepreneurs may lie in the 
form of regulatory flexibility. If a regulatory action represents a competitive 
disadvantage to Minority entrepreneurs, the government may consider relaxing 
from its purview Minority-Owned Businesses. For example, the government can 
request that regulating agencies perform a “regulatory flexibility analysis,” 
specifying the effect of the proposed (or existing) rule on Minority-owned 
entities.149 Similar analysis on the effect of regulation on small businesses has 
been incorporated in the U.S. legal system since the early twentieth century, 
when the typical business enterprise was small, local, and personal.150 Moreover, 
another possible effective measure would be to afford regulatory exclusions 
similarly to the numerous regulatory exceptions currently provided to small 
business owners.151 For example, relief (even if temporary) from certain 
reporting and paperwork requirements can serve as a Minority-based 
adjustment.152  
Nevertheless, exclusions do not eliminate regulatory costs altogether 
because Minority entrepreneurs will still have to learn about the existence of 
such regulatory exclusions, determine whether they apply, and monitor and stay 
up to date on new or revised regulatory exclusions. Thus, indirect costs of 
learning the various secondary exclusionary rules will persist in some manner.153 
Lastly, morally speaking, Minority-based regulatory flexibility should be 
applied only in legal areas that, on balance, may not exacerbate social welfare 
causing greater harm to health, privacy, environment, or increasing the risk of 
defrauding the public.154 
 
 149 This is similar to the small business regulatory flexibility analysis in 5 U.S.C. § 602. See generally Paul 
Verkuil, A Critical Guide to the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 1982 DUKE L.J. 213, 216–26 (1982) (reviewing the 
requirements under the act). 
 150 See Mirit Eyal-Cohen, Why Is Small Business the Chief Business of Congress?, 43 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 14 
(detailing historical consequences that preceded small business deregulation). 
 151 See generally Mirit Eyal-Cohen, Down-Sizing the “Little Guy” Myth in Legal Definitions, 98 IOWA L. 
REV. 1041, 1042 (2013) (reviewing small business deregulation in various areas of the law). 
 152 For a discussion on the constitutionality of race-based classifications, see Charlie Penrod & Christopher 
L. Atkinson, Rothe Development v. U.S. Department of Defense: Overcomplicating the Uncomplicated, 25 TEX. 
J. C.L. & C.R. 81, 82 (2019) (criticizing a recent decision in the case of Rothe Development that held that using 
race as a factor in SBA Minority contracting does not make the consideration race-based, and for negating the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena holding race-based classifications used in the 
selection process for federal contractors must pass strict scrutiny to survive). 
 153 See generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Small Is Not Beautiful: The Case Against Special Regulatory 
Treatment of Small Firm, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 537, 542–43 (1998) (claiming small business exemptions are 
inefficient). 
 154 See, e.g., Thomas Lee Hazen, Social Networks and the Securities Laws – Why the Specially Tailored 
Exemption Must Be Conditioned on Meaningful Disclosure, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1735, 1745–46 (2012) (criticizing 
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B. Inclusive Networks to Develop Mentorship and Information Sharing 
Empirical studies have shown that—independent of the quality of the 
application—Minority applicants are significantly less likely to secure a patent 
relative to others due to bias during application process at the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office.155 Obtaining funding to seek assistance with, prepare, search, 
and engage in patent process review is a costly endeavor. Scholars indicated that 
Minority entrepreneurs more frequently cannot secure such funding, do not have 
access to support networks, lack knowledge about the process, and, as a result, 
forgo patent protection altogether.156 According to the National Venture Capital 
Association, 87% of venture capitalists are White, 9% are Asian, 2% are African 
American or Latino, and 2% are of mixed race.157 Where can Minority 
entrepreneurs seek inexpensive advice on how to scale their knowledge and 
discovery? 
1. Cooperatives, Incubators, and Accelerators 
Although Minority Firms often are not able to pinpoint one “defining 
moment” that led to financial success, peer advice from other Minority 
entrepreneurs has been found to be more useful than other strategies.158 
Accordingly, some asymmetric burdens and discriminatory practices could be 
mitigated through collaborative measures. Minority entrepreneurs can form 
industrial cooperatives and networks to share legal and regulatory information 
as well as market opportunities and strategies.159 Such collaborative platforms 
can be incorporated in current Minority industrial associations such as the 
African-American Entrepreneurs Association and National Hispanic Business 
Group that aim to advocate, educate, and connect culturally responsible 
entrepreneurs and maintain a positive impact the community.160 Regulatory data 
 
the various small business exemptions in securities law); Pierce, supra note 153, at 537, 558 (noting that small 
businesses are responsible for more cases of discrimination). 
 155 W. Michael Schuster R., R. Evan Davis, Kourtenay Schley & Julie Ravenscraft, An Empirical Study of 
Patent Grant Rates as a Function of Race and Gender, 57 AM. BUS. L.J. 281, 281 (2020) (examining the rate at 
which patent applications are granted as a function of the inventor’s race and gender). 
 156 See Miriam Marcowitz-Bitton & Emily Michiko Morris, The Distributive Effects of IP Registration, 
23 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 306, 349 (2020) (exploring the distributive implications of such two-tiered regimes of 
registered and unregistered rights). 
157 Dorothy A. Brown, Diversity and the High-Tech Industry, 6 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 95, 105 (2014).  
 158 ENCHAUTEGUI ET AL., supra note 139, at 10. 
 159 See, e.g., Dariam M. Ibrahim, Financing the Next Silicon Valley, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 717, 726 (2010) 
(naming Stanford Research Park as an example for academic-industrial cooperation). 
 160 See African American Entrepreneurs Association: Advocate, Educate, Connect, AFRICAN AM. 
ENTREPRENEURS ASS’N, https://aaeassociation.org/ (last visited Aug. 3, 2021); About Us, NAT’L HISPANIC BUS. 
GRP., https://www.nhbg.org/ (last visited Aug. 3, 2021). 
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and industry information accumulated by Minority entrepreneurs can be 
collected, organized, and conveyed to network members for a minimal fee or in 
exchange for contributing to the cooperative’s database of advice and 
knowledge. The collaborative network can likewise maintain information 
sharing forums, provide free webinars by veteran members, or recruit experts 
and legal advisors to counsel Minority entrepreneurs on specific compliance 
issues at a reduced or no cost. 
Another way to increase financial opportunities and business information to 
Minority-owned firms is to create more Minority-designated accelerators and 
incubators. Incubators and accelerators are innovation agents that help mostly 
early-stage entrepreneurs.161 Thus, it is important to first point out the 
differences between these two models. Both incubators and accelerators furnish 
entrepreneurs with a variety of resources, such as coaching, business training, 
access to capital, networking, and free or sponsored office space. Nevertheless, 
the International Business Innovation Association describe incubators mainly as 
nonprofits with an economic development agenda, such as job creation and 
community development, who supply firms with programs, services, and space 
for differing periods of time depending on their organizational needs and 
strategies without receiving any monetary compensation from participating 
firms.162 Accelerators are mostly revenue-driven ventures funded by private 
capital and focused on early-stage investments.163 They typically choose a group 
of firms and provide specific training that culminates in a public pitch event or 
demonstration day for investors. Accelerators may also invest seed money in 
participating firms in exchange for equity.164  
The SBA reported that Minority entrepreneurs suffer from lack of 
appropriate business education and managerial experience.165 Indeed, when 
Minority entrepreneurs begin to develop their businesses, they may experience 
extreme challenges regarding networking, information, and capital.166 One way 
 
 161 See generally Brad Bernthal, Investment Accelerators, 21 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 139, 139 (2016) 
(noting the role of accelerators as information networks and institutions that support entrepreneurs.). 
 162 About Us, INT’L BUS. INNOVATION ASS’N, https://inbia.org/about/ (last visited Aug. 3, 2021). 
 163 See C. Scott Dempwolf, Jennifer Auer & Michelle D’Ippolito, Innovation Accelerators: Defining 
Characteristics Among Startup Assistance Organizations 23 (SBA, Working Paper No. SBAHQ-13-M-0197, 
2014), https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/rs425-Innovation-Accelerators-Report-FINAL.pdf. 
 164 It is worth noting that incubators and accelerators are distinguished from shared working environments 
that offer entrepreneurs and other professionals business services and networking opportunities in a space shared 
with others similar entrepreneurs. Id. at 10. 
 165 ROBB, supra note 34, at 11. 
 166 See Wanda Eugene, Yerika Jimenez, Ekaterina Muravevskaia, Carmen Lopez-Ramirez & Juan Gilbert, 
Moving Beyond Stuck: A Design-Based Approach to Enhancing Minority Tech Startup Launches, in HCI 
INTERNATIONAL 2020 (Constantine Stephanidis, Margherita Antona & Stavroula Ntoa eds., 2020) (claiming 
EYAL-COHENFINAL_8.17.21 8/26/2021 10:50 AM 
2021] PROMOTING RACIALLY DIVERSE ENTREPRENEURSHIP 1603 
to alter that is for Entrepreneurial Development Centers to partner with 
Minority-concentrated colleges and Historically Black Colleges and 
Universities (HBCUs) as a means of improving business opportunities and 
professional development of Minorities.167 A complementary manner may lay 
with “Minority incubators.”168 
Incubators are intended to assist all emerging entrepreneurs in building 
networks and obtaining knowledge and capital. However, Minorities remain 
greatly underrepresented in firms supported by incubators, as they are dominated 
mainly by white-male entrepreneurs.169 As Professor Dorothy Brown has 
argued, given that it is no longer acceptable to be overtly racist, the bulk of 
racism has gone underground; unconscious racism is today’s enemy.170 
Accordingly, increasing the number of Minority-designated incubators and 
accelerators can be an important piece of the puzzle. Such organizations can 
provide tailored opportunities for mentorship, learning, and networking, as well 
as a place to benefit from Minority peer support and feedback. The hurdles 
facing racially diverse entrepreneurs who lack social capital and networks are 
more pronounced and can be better solved by professionals with specialized 
knowledge and experience working with and representing Minority 
organizations.171 Currently, while there are many organizations that advertise 
they support Minority entrepreneurs, there are only a limited number of 
incubators and accelerators that focus solely on Minority-owned startups.172 One 
such example is “Black Ambition” recently launched by producer and rapper 
Pharrell Williams. This incubator is designated for Black and Latinx 
entrepreneurs in tech, design, healthcare, and consumer products and provides 
 
Black entrepreneurs do not have access to venture capital and get “stuck from the start”). 
 167 See TIFFIANY HOWARD, NAOMI SMITH & UJU NWAIGWE, BANKS AND THE BLACK COMMUNITY, WHAT 
CAN MAJOR COMMERCIAL AND RETAIL BANKING INSTITUTIONS DO TO BETTER SUPPORT BLACK 
ENTREPRENEURS AND BUSINESSES IN THE U.S.? (2020), http://thoward.faculty.unlv.edu/wp-content/uploads/ 
2020/06/BOA-REPORT-FINAL_2020.pdf. 
 168 See Eugene et al., supra note 166, at 19 (claiming Black entrepreneurs do not have access to venture 
capital and get “stuck from the start”). 
 169 Id. at 20. 
 170 Dorothy A. Brown, Fighting Racism in the Twenty-First Century, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1485, 
1489–90 (2004). 
 171 See Jennifer Owens, Alexander Riehm & Flavius R. W. Lilly, Social Innovation Microgrants as 
Catalysts to Community Development in Economically Marginalized Urban Communities, 18 U. MD. L.J. RACE, 
RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 352, 360 (2018) (describing the effect of microgrants on urban communities). 
 172 For an updated list of such organizations, see Startup Ecosystem Canvas: Black Americans, FOUNDER 
INST., https://fi.co/insight/black-american-startup-resource-list-200-accelerators-incubators-investors-and-more 
(last visited Aug. 3, 2021). 
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awards ranging from $1 million for a national competition to a $250,000 
scholarship to attend an HBCU.173 
Moreover, because most incubators are currently situated in high-income 
and less-diverse communities, it would be beneficial to also establish incubators 
in areas with higher concentrations of Minority entrepreneurs, such as inner 
cities.174 Scaling and establishing more Minority incubators in segregated 
neighborhoods and inner cities across the U.S. would trickle down and help spur 
the growth of more successful Minority-Owned Businesses, which in turn would 
help to revitalize these areas.175 
Expanding and supporting representation by Minorities also necessitates 
making incubators more inclusive. Incubators and accelerators typically use 
selection panels to decide which ventures to support, and the composition of 
these panels can create biased outcomes.176 For instance, the 2010 Venture 
Capital Human Capital Report found that only 17% of private, early-stage 
internet companies receiving venture capital in the first half of 2010 had a 
minority on the founding team, and only 13% of founders of internet firms 
receiving venture capital are Minorities.177 This need for reform is especially 
true because incubators and accelerators attract mostly young entrepreneurs; a 
new report from the Brookings Institute’s Metropolitan Policy Program revealed 
that the millennial generation is America’s largest generation at 75 million, with 
a Minority population of 44%. These millennials are set to serve as a social, 
economic, and political bridge to future (and increasingly racially diverse) 
generations.178 This demographic trend emphasizes the critical importance of 
making incubators and accelerators more racially inclusive to ensure that all 
future entrepreneurs are given the same level of support and to offer 
 
 173 Monica Melton, Pharrell Launches Black Ambition, An Accelerator for Black and Latinx 
Entrepreneurs, FORBES (Dec 2, 2020).), https://www.forbes.com/sites/monicamelton/2020/12/02/pharrell-
launches-black-ambition-an-accelerator-for-black-and-latinx-entrepreneurs/?sh=2f3c21f7461e. 
 174 See INITIATIVE FOR A COMPETITIVE INNER CITY (“ICIC”), AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY 1 (2015) 
(examining 261 incubators and pointing out that only 24% are in inner cities, although they make up only 10% 
of the population nationwide and include 21% of minorities). 
 175 For example, in Detroit, an expected 86% (1,237) of Minority Firms are located downtown. Detroit 
Kitchen Connect and TechTown Detroit are incubators with 90% Minority entrepreneurs supported via various 
mentorship and acceleration programs. See ICIC, CREATING INCLUSIVE HIGH-TECH INCUBATORS AND 
ACCELERATORS: STRATEGIES TO INCREASE PARTICIPATION RATES OF WOMEN AND MINORITY ENTREPRENEURS 
9, 14 (2016), http://icic.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/ICIC_JPMC_Incubators_post.pdf?58f619. 
 176 See id. 
 177 Id. 
 178 WILLIAM H. FREY, BROOKINGS INST. METRO. POL’Y PROGRAM, THE MILLENNIAL GENERATION: A 
DEMOGRAPHIC BRIDGE TO AMERICA’S DIVERSE FUTURE 2 (2018), https://www.brookings.edu/research/ 
millennials/. 
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underrepresented entrepreneurs opportunities to build confidence, develop their 
skills, learn sustainable practices, and maintain peer support networks.179 
2. Coaching, Training, and Mentoring for Established Minority Firms 
Minorities ranked fellow business owners who shared advice, experience, 
and connections as the most helpful source of assistance.180 Outside consultants 
and the Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization were other 
sources of support that were helpful to Minority firms that sought advice 
regarding Minority contracting.181 These were found to be useful for 
understanding and learning how to successfully navigate through complex 
regulatory paperwork, multifaceted procedures, and cumbersome guidelines. 
Over the years, scholars have pointed to the significance of social networks in 
supporting all phases of firm development.182 Sharing peer experiences saves 
time and capital when obtaining such information183 and helps Minority 
entrepreneurs become familiar with administrative procedures, obtain legal 
advice, and pay fines and penalties for noncompliance.184 
Establishing Minority-designated coaching programs could provide free 
mentoring and personal and business consultation. Minorities frequently do not 
have access to the same level of institutional knowledge as their white 
counterparts, possibly because mentorship resources are allocated to those with 
whom “the mentors are most comfortable, and these may tend to be juniors of 
the same race and gender as the mentors.”185 Training and mentoring can help 
Minority Firms with growing an established business, developing leadership, 
and achieving financial independence. Obtaining such targeted guidance could 
help prevent Minority Firms from making costly mistakes, and it could provide 
 
 179 Owens et al. supra note 171, at 359–60 (“[T]he entrepreneurship-enhancing effect of community social 
capital is stronger for white than for minority individuals.” (quoting Seok-Woo Kwon, Colleen M. Heflin & 
Martin Ruef, Community Social Capital and Entrepreneurship, 78 AM. SOCIO. REV. 980, 986 (2013))). 
 180 ENCHAUTEGUI ET AL., supra note 139, at 15. 
 181 See, e.g., Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization, U.S. DEP’T COM., https://www. 
commerce.gov/bureaus-and-offices/os/cfo-asa/small-and-disadvantaged-business-utilization (last visited Apr. 
25, 2021). 
 182 See Oswald Jones & Dilani Jayawarna, Resourcing New Businesses: Social Networks, Bootstrapping 
and Firm Performance, 12 VENTURE CAP. 127, 128 (2010) (investigating how social networks can influence 
business performance). 
 183 See Jeff Schwartz, The Twilight of Equity Liquidity, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 531, 580 (2012) (noting that 
young firms suffer higher compliance costs up-front). 
 184 See, e.g., Kristine M. Kuhn & Tera L. Galloway, With a Little Help from My Competitors: Peer 
Networking Among Artisan Entrepreneurs, 39 ENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY & PRAC. 571 (2015) (surveying 
entrepreneurs and showing types of advice and support they value and provide to others). 
 185 Devon Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Race to the Top of the Corporate Ladder: What Minorities Do When 
They Get There, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1645, 1668 (2004). 
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additional resources and networks. This can be made possible by assigning 
coaches and financial analysts with similar backgrounds, as much as possible, 
to allow a better rapport during such activities. Minority-designated coaching 
strategies may include identifying new customers and achieving marketing 
goals, thus increasing sales and successful scaling. There are many possible 
venues for fostering such programs, such as local civic centers, university 
community outreach programs, or the Small Business Development Centers that 
currently operate similar assistance programs for women and veterans. 
Such one-on-one targeted Minority coaching can have a substantial effect on 
improving operations, growing the business, building wealth through Minority 
designated lending, attaining a Minority business certification, and securing 
Minority procurement contracts and set asides. In that context, the Minority 
Business Development Agency (MBDA) at the U.S. Department of Commerce 
could also be utilized for that purpose. This federal agency was created with a 
mandate to foster the growth of Minority-Owned Businesses, specifically in 
communities of color.186 Over the years, the MBDA has been criticized for being 
a severely neglected institution with limited authority and funding.187 
Nevertheless, it could be revamped and inspired to fill a much-needed gap in 
supporting Minority Firms.188 Its unique history and current structure could give 
the Biden Administration a new opportunity to channel funding to the agency. 
Similar to the SBA mandate, the MBDA can be authorized to advocate in 
Congress and address the racial inequality of Minority Firms within existing 
legislation and congressional appropriation.189 
C. Designated Capital-Growth Programs 
Economically disadvantaged individuals are socially disadvantaged 
individuals whose ability to compete in the free enterprise system has 
been impaired due to diminished capital and credit opportunities as 
 
 186 See Who We Are, MINORITY BUS. DEV. AGENCY, https://www.mbda.gov/who-we-are/overview (last 
visited Aug. 3, 2021). 
 187 See CONNOR MAXWELL, DARRICK HAMILTON, ANDRE M. PERRY & DANYELLE SOLOMON, A 
BLUEPRINT FOR REVAMPING THE MINORITY BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT AGENCY (2020), https://www. 
americanprogress.org/issues/race/reports/2020/07/31/488423/blueprint-revamping-minority-business-
development-agency/ (“[T]he MBDA’s effectiveness is currently limited by narrow authority and meager 
funding.”). 
 188 Id. (criticizing the MBDA inefficiency due to lack of funding). 
 189 Id. at 1–2 (“Under the current congressional appropriations, the president need only include language 
in his annual budget proposal asking for a significant increase in funding,” which can be channeled to different 
projects). 
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compared to others in the same or similar line of business who are not 
socially disadvantaged.190 
1. Removing Biases in Lending and Microgrants 
Funding support is an essential component of fostering Minority 
entrepreneurship. As stated above, household wealth and informal funding from 
friends and family for new ideas play an important role in supporting emergent 
entrepreneurs.191 “At the early stage of idea formation, risk-tolerant, ‘patient’ 
sources of funds are important to testing [and developing] a new idea.”192 
However, Minority entrepreneurs lack this monetary cushion and these capital 
reserves. This creates a severe lack of access to capital for Minorities and greatly 
disadvantages them in the entrepreneurial process.193 Moreover, current 
financial institutions and borrowing practices are deeply rooted in biases and 
race-based inequities.194 Again, these discriminatory practices in lending are 
immense hurdles to the expansion of Minority-Owned Businesses, contributing 
to their failure and marginal stake in the market. The need to remedy lending 
biases is of utmost importance in narrowing the race-based wealth gap.195 
Undeniably, traditional underwriting systems rely heavily on information 
about an applicant’s income and credit history. For example, Black borrowers 
often realize that to accumulate credit, a person must already have a reviewable 
good credit history.196 As another example, financial institutions often offer 
financial products and services to consumers in the form of market 
segmentation—the process of “dividing the population into niches according to 
[demographic] characteristics to gauge individuals’ attractiveness as targets for 
financial products.”197 Nevertheless, such practices often single out Black 
borrowers for predatory loans and harmful financial products, a practice that has 
been dubbed “reverse redlining.”198 Civil rights attorney John P. Relman noted 
the following: 
 
 190 13 CFR § 124.104.(a) (2018). 
 191 See supra notes 8–14 and accompanying text. 
 192 Owens et al., supra note 171, at 359. 
 193 Julia F. Hollresier, Note, Closing the Racial Gap in Financial Services: Balancing Algorithmic 
Opportunity with Legal Limitations, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 1233, 1234 (2020) (arguing that lending algorithms 
are discriminatory and contribute to the racial gap). 
 194 See Baradaran, supra note 88, at 911. 
 195 Id. at 909. 
 196 Hollresier, supra note 193, at 1255. 
 197 Id. at 1244 (quoting Linda E. Fisher, Target Marketing of Subprime Loans: Racialized Consumer 
Fraud & Reverse Redlining, 18 J.L. & POL’Y 121, 129 (2009)). 
 198 Id. at 1245. 
EYAL-COHENFINAL_8.17.21 8/26/2021 10:50 AM 
1608 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70:1577 
The legacy of historic discrimination . . . often leaves the residents of 
minority communities desperate for credit, and without the knowledge 
or experience required to identify loan products and lenders offering 
products with the most advantageous terms for which they might 
qualify. Instead, residents of underserved minority communities often 
respond favorably to the first offer of credit made, without regard to 
the fairness of the product.199 
Looking ahead, there are various ways to assist Minority Firms with 
acquiring capital to start, grow, and expand. The SBA’s 7(a) primary loan 
programs provide over nine types of financial assistance to small businesses with 
different guaranteed percentages and loan amounts.200 Outside of these 
programs, the SBA launched a few limited pilot programs that offer any small 
business “Community Advantage” loan guarantees between 75% and 85% by 
the SBA through local lenders to businesses based on the business’s location in 
an underserved area ranging from $50,000 to $250,000 with interest rates 
between 7% and 10%.201 Likewise, microloan programs provide any small 
business with amounts between $500 and $50,000 and interest rates of 8% to 
13%, payable within 6 years.202 These programs can be expanded and redesigned 
to give small Minority-Owned Businesses along with a more flexible and guided 
application process.203 
Another option is to designate loan officers in banks who can understand, 
identify, and address the race-based financial inequity and biases Minority 
clients face in lending. Such funding support can be delivered to Minority-
Owned Businesses via designated Minority small business microgrants204 whose 
limited scope reduces the risk to financial institutions and may help Minority 
 
 199 John P. Relman, Foreclosures, Integration, and the Future of the Fair Housing Act, 41 IND. L. REV. 
629, 637 (2008). 
 200 Types of 7a Loans, SMALL BUS. ADMIN., https://www.sba.gov/partners/lenders/7a-loan-program/ 
types-7a-loans (last visited Aug. 3, 2021). 
 201 Pilot Loan Programs, SMALL BUS. ADMIN., https://www.sba.gov/partners/lenders/7a-loan-program/ 
pilot-loan-programs (last visited Aug. 3, 2021). 
 202 Id.; Microloan Program, SMALL BUS. ADMIN., https://www.sba.gov/loans-grants/see-what-sba-
offers/sba-loan-programs/microloan-program%20 (last visited Aug. 3, 2021). 
 203 Prioritizing Minority owners has been recently held unconstitutional in the case of Greer’s Ranch Café 
v. Guzman, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102243, 1, F. Supp. 3d, 2021 WL 2092995 (2021) (holding unconstitutional 
section 5003 of the American Rescue Plan Act that appropriates $28.6 billion to create the Restaurant 
Revitalization Fund for those harmed by Covid-19 pandemic administered by the Small Business Administration 
that prioritize in the first 21 days of the program restaurants according to the race and sex of the owner.) 
 204 Owens et al., supra note 171, at 360 (“Given the importance of social capital and networks in 
supporting innovation and the role of the household wealth and informal, friends and family funding for new 
ideas, there is a strong case for microgrants to supplement these funds at the earliest stage of an innovation’s 
development.”). 
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Firms to establish a good credit history and receive more credit further down the 
road. 
Artificial Intelligence and algorithmic models for assessing creditworthiness 
that rely on income level and credit history tend to generate racially 
discriminated results.205 As a result, numerous scholars have called for reforms 
of the Fair Credit Reporting Act that mandate banking compliance rules in this 
area.206 Nevertheless, they also have the potential to make financial services 
more accessible to underserved communities.207 Financial institutions can 
implement certain strategies by using big data assessment models and credit 
algorithms that are fairer to Minority-Owned Businesses, ensuring that such 
practices avoid discriminatory effects.208 Instead of relying solely on income and 
credit history (which Minorities often lack), algorithmic models can be designed 
to draw on a broader range of predictive variables. Consequently, allowing 
banks to fine-tune the weight given in algorithmic models to other factors aside 
from income level and credit score (without creating new biases) may solve the 
paradox that many Minority entrepreneurs face involving the need to have an 
established credit history prior to building credit.209 Increasing dedicated access 
to capital aimed at business growth not only helps prevent business failure and 
encourage business expansion, but can also act as a catalyst in economically 
marginalized neighborhoods.210 
2. Revamping Government Contracting Programs 
[T]he opportunity for full participation in our free enterprise system 
by socially and economically disadvantaged persons is essential if we 
are to obtain social and economic equality for such persons and 
improve the functioning of our national economy.211 
 
 205 See Kristin N. Johnson, Automating the Risk of Bias, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 101 (2019) (pointing to 
the tension between attaining efficiency and the fact that automated decision-making platforms may demonstrate 
biases, but do not democratize markets and increase exclusion of minority participants); Hollreiser, supra note 
193, at 1248–49. 
 206 See, e.g., Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 671, 
732 (2016) (calling for caution in the use of data mining, due the risks of inherent prejudices against members 
of protected classes). 
 207 Hollreiser, supra note 193, at 1255; Baradaran, supra note 88, at 940. 
 208 Hollreiser, supra note 193, at 1235. 
 209 Id. at 1255; see also Baradaran, supra note 88 (discussing the experience of Minority entrepreneurs in 
the U.S. in the last fifty years). 
 210 Owens et al., supra note 171, at 352. 
 211 An Act to Amend the Small Business Act and the Small Business Investment Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 
95-507, 92 Stat. 1757, 1760 (1978). 
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The extensive history of Minority set-aside programs can be traced back to 
New Deal efforts in the 1930s. These programs have the potential to serve as a 
public policy tool to reduce systemic racism in government contracting.212 Since 
1978, Congress has required federal agencies to consult with the SBA and 
establish goals to award agency contracts to socioeconomically disadvantaged 
businesses.213 The SBA currently runs a federal contract set-aside program for 
Minority-owned businesses—The Minority Small Business and Capital 
Ownership Development Program—commonly known as the 8(a) Program.214 
The program’s purpose “is to assist eligible small disadvantaged business 
concerns to compete in the American economy through business 
development.”215 A “set-aside” award is a contract-grant for which only 
designated contractors may compete (as opposed to a “sole-source” award that 
is awarded to such entities without competition).216 In Fiscal Year 2019, 8(a) 
firms were granted $30.4 billion in government contracts, including $8.6 billion 
in 8(a) set-aside grants and $9.9 billion in 8(a) sole-source awards.217 
8(a) Program award eligibility is limited to small businesses owned and 
controlled by “one or more socially and economically disadvantaged individuals 
who are of good character and citizens of [and residing in] the United States” 
and demonstrate “potential for success.”218 Members of certain racial and ethnic 
groups are presumed to be socially disadvantaged, while other individuals can 
prove they are also socially disadvantaged. To be considered “economically 
disadvantaged,” an individual must have (and continue to have) a net worth of 
less than $750,000.219 When determining whether an applicant has “good 
character,” the SBA takes into account criminal conduct and violations of SBA 
federal contracting rules.220 A firm wishing to establish “potential for success” 
 
 212 See Bessie House-Soremekum, The Impact of Minority Set-Aside Programs on Black Business Success 
in Cleveland, Ohio: Implications for Public Policy, 30 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 19, 28 (2007) (providing a 
historical review of government set-aside programs). 
 213 In 1978, Congress amended the Small Business Act of 1953 and the Small Business Investment Act of 
1958 to require specific set-aside goals. An Act to Amend Small Business Act and the Small Business Investment 
Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 95-507, 92 Stat. 1757 (1978). 
 214 See Section 8(a) of the Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. § 637; 13 C.F.R. §§ 121, 124 & 134 (2011) 
(authorizing the SBA to make contracts with other Federal agencies to furnish equipment, materials, or services 
and subsequently delegate the provision of these contracts to qualified minority-owned firms). 
 215 63 Fed. Reg. 35,740 (June 30, 1998) (codified at 13 C.F.R. pt. 124). 
 216 See Set-Aside Procurement, SMALL BUS. ADMIN., https://www.sba.gov/partners/contracting-officials/ 
small-business-procurement/set-aside-procurement (last visited Aug. 3, 2021). 
 217 ROBERT JAY DILGER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44844, SBA’S “8(A) PROGRAM”: OVERVIEW, HISTORY, 
AND CURRENT ISSUES 1 (2021). 
 218 13 C.F.R. § 124.101. (2020). 
 219 13 C.F.R § 124.104(c)(2) (2020). 
 220 Id. 
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needs to be in business for at least two years immediately prior to applying to 
the program.221 Currently, there are about fifty federal socioeconomic programs 
that have implemented this type of 8(a) designated contracting process.222 
Yet, the Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (“DBE”) program is an example 
of an 8(a) Minority-designated set-aside program developed at the Department 
of Transportation that illustrates the ambiguity and inefficiency of many of these 
programs.223 A DBE is defined as a for-profit small business that is at least 51% 
owned, managed, and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged 
individuals.224 However, even qualifying as a DBE entails navigating through a 
large amount of red tape and bureaucracy.225 DBEs must develop and submit 
within sixty days a comprehensive business plan setting forth its business 
targets, objectives, and goals.226 Thereafter, the DBE goes into a two-year 
developmental stage and five-year transitional stage allowing it to obtain 
government contract support, financial assistance, and training.227 Yet, like the 
MBDA, the DBE program has been criticized for its complexity and regulatory 
 
 221 Id. 
 222 Dennis E. Black, Effectiveness of the Mandatory Minority Business Set-Aside Contracting Goals: A 
Regression Analysis, 7 EVALUATION REV. 321, 322 (1983). 
 223 13 C.F.R. § 124.402 (2020). The business plan must contain “[a] detailed description of any products 
currently being produced and any services currently being performed by the concern, as well as any future plans 
to enter into one or more new markets;” “[a]n analysis of market potential, competitive environment;” and “[a]n 
analysis of the concern’s strengths and weaknesses, with particular attention on ways to correct any financial, 
managerial, technical, or work force conditions which could impede the concern from receiving and performing 
non-8(a) contracts,” among other requirements. Id. 
 224 13 C.F.R. § 124.103 (2020). “Socially Disadvantaged” individuals are those who have been subjected 
to racial or ethnic prejudice or cultural bias due to their identities as members of certain groups. Id. Their social 
disadvantage must stem from circumstances beyond their control. Id. The rule includes a rebuttable presumption 
that certain listed individuals are socially disadvantaged, including Black Americans, Hispanic Americans, 
Native Americans, and Asian Pacific Americans, among others. Id. Individuals who are not members of the 
explicitly designated groups can be considered socially disadvantaged, but they must demonstrate that they have 
suffered from social disadvantage that is chronic and substantial in addition to meeting other enumerated criteria. 
Id. 
 225 For a list of what a concern must submit to apply to the 8(a) BD program, see 13 C.F.R. § 124.203 
(2020) (detailing the information and documentation each 8(a) BD firm must submit in support of its application 
for admission to the SBA 8(a) BD program, including, but not limited to, financial data and statements, copies 
of filed federal personal and business tax returns, individual and business bank statements, personal history 
statements, etc.). 
 226 See 13 C.F.R. § 124.402 (2020); GA. DEP’T TRANSP., GEORGIA UNIFIED CERTIFICATION PROGRAM: 
DISADVANTAGED BUSINESS ENTERPRISE 2019 PROGRAM PLAN 16 (2019), http://www.dot.ga.gov/PartnerSmart/ 
Business/Documents/Plan/Disadvantaged%20Business%20Enterprise%202019%20Program%20Plan-Signed. 
pdf. 
 227 Appendix C to Part 26 - DBE Business Development Program Guidelines, U.S. DEP’T TRANSP., 
https://www.transportation.gov/osdbu/disadvantaged-business-enterprise/appendix-c-to-part-26-dbe-business-
development-program-guidelines (last visited Aug. 3, 2021). 
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costs.228 Mounting fraud and misuse infiltrated the program and redirected its 
focus and funding toward investigations and misrepresentation while denying 
opportunities to genuine Minority Firms.229 This example illustrates that 
government contracting is a costly and complex process, especially for Minority 
Firms.230 They struggle to maneuver through the multifaceted procedures for 
qualifying as a “certified minority” to benefit from these programs.231 As a 
result, they do not obtain the same ratio of government contracts as non-Minority 
firms.232 
Scholars, research agencies, and the media have criticized these Minority 
set-aside programs for their lack of oversight and widespread abuse.233 A recent 
Congressional Research Service report stated there has been a current decline in 
the number of participants in the Minority government contracting programs.234 
The programs’ complexities as well as their lack of oversight and core 
safeguards eroded their efficiency and allowed questionable white-owned firms 
to abuse them.235 Another study found that affirmative action programs and, by 
extension, Minority contracting programs appear to have a positive empirical 
impact on the success of Black business owners.236 Other empirical studies have 
demonstrated that such mandatory goal-setting procedures have not had a 
statistically significant positive effect on increasing the federal contract dollars 
given to Minority-Owned Businesses.237 Thus, to assure these programs are 
 
 228 Hongtao Dang & Jennifer S. Shane, Fraud and Abuse Schemes in the Disadvantaged Business 
Enterprise Program, 12 J. LEGAL AFF. & DISP. RESOL. ENG’G & CONSTR. 1, 1 (2020) (discussing fraud and 
inefficiency of the program). 
 229 Id. 
 230 Alysha Sideman, Women, Minorities Pay a High Price for Procurement Gains, WASH. TECH. DAILY 
(Mar. 6, 2012), https://washingtontechnology.com/articles/2012/03/06/women-minority-contracting-study.aspx 
(citing an American Express survey finding that, for Minorities, the annual investment made to seek federal 
contracts was 35% higher than for the average small firm with the same credentials). 
 231 Id.; cf. House-Soremekum, supra note 212 (discussing the large number of Minority and women 
business owners who remain uncertified in Cleveland, Ohio, and how it affects their success). 
 232 See Chris Burrell, Disparities in Government Contracting Hurt Minority-Owned Businesses, NPR (Feb. 
20, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/02/20/807126443/disparities-in-government-contracting-hurt-minority-owned-
businesses (citing to a federal study by the MBDA in early 2017 that determined no increase in Minority-Owned 
Business participation in public contracts). 
 233 Id.; see also Mattie Quinn, Governments Struggle to Root Out Fake Minority Contractors, GOVERNING 
(Apr. 2016), https://www.governing.com/topics/mgmt/gov-women-minority-contracting.html (claiming that 
states and cities want to support women- and Minority-Owned Businesses but that they often do not look into 
who they are really paying). 
 234 DILGER, supra note 217, at 33. 
 235 For example, the SBA excluded equity in a primary residence from the calculation of an individual’s 
net worth. See Dang & Shane, supra note 228 (reviewing the past and present of the DBE program). 
 236 House-Soremekum, supra note 212, at 33. 
 237 See MINORITY BUS. DEV. AGENCY, CONTRACTING BARRIERS AND FACTORS AFFECTING MINORITY 
BUSINESS ENTERPRISES: A REVIEW OF EXISTING DISPARITY STUDIES 11, 37 (2016), https://www.mbda.gov/sites/ 
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indeed effective in promoting and improving the survival rates of Minority 
Firms, there is a need to put greater emphasis on attaining contracting success. 
A better approach could be to deliver the opportunities to Minority Firms 
through a direct channel. Designated professionals who specialize in identifying 
potential contractual opportunities for Minorities in federal, state, and local 
agencies can provide targeted assistance to Minority Firms.238 The certification 
process for licensing such procurement specialists should not only assess their 
knowledge of how to correctly fill in forms and compete for contracts, but also 
familiarize the specialists with the particular hurdles that Minority entrepreneurs 
face. Agents familiar with the obstacles Minority Firms confront can help them 
by informing them about potential contracts for their products and services. This 
includes educating, familiarizing, and ushering them through the bid process, as 
well as assisting them with obtaining and preparing documentations, proposals, 
and other contractual forms. Providing Minority entrepreneurs with specialized 
guidance on how to conform to rules as well as maintain quality assurance as it 
relates to government-specific contracts or requirements will help them remain 
compliant and increase their chances of securing future government contracts. 
3. Sponsoring Credit Rehabilitation Services for Minorities 
As detailed in Part II, Minority bankruptcy petitioners are more likely to 
have less access to private resources and outside financing, making them more 
financially fragile than their non-Minority counterparts.239 Since whites 
disproportionately own the type of assets that bankruptcy protects, bankruptcy 
laws favor white debtors over Black debtors.240 A preferable alternative to 
traditional bankruptcy proceedings would be for the government to offer credit 
rehabilitation services to Minorities. 
The unregulated and predatory nature of the lending industry makes relying 
on private credit building agencies to provide adequate credit restoration 
services to Minorities impractical.241 For example, Hispanic and Black 
 
default/files/migrated/files-attachments/ContractingBarriers_AReviewofExistingDisparityStudies.pdf; Dennis 
E. Black, Effectiveness of the Mandatory Minority Business Set-Aside Contracting Goals: A Regression 
Analysis, 7 EVALUATION REV. 321, 330 (1983) (concluding Minority set-asides have no statistically significant 
positive effect in increasing federal contract dollars to Minority-Owned Businesses). 
 238 There are currently two SBA programs designed to support 8(a) firms: the 7(j) Management and 
Technical Assistance Program and the 8(a) Mentor-Protégé Program. See DILGER, supra note 217, at 1. 
 239 See supra Part II. 
 240 Van Loo, supra note 86, at 233. 
 241 See Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of 
Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255 (2002) (discussing the origins of predatory lending and its negative 
social consequences). 
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homeowners are most likely to be the targets of predatory lending.242 In 
identifying communities to target, “predatory lenders need to identify people 
who are disconnected from the credit economy and therefore unlikely or unable 
to engage in comparison shopping.”243 These communities often are more likely 
to be people of color who, because of credit rationing, discrimination, and other 
social forces, have not had experience with legitimate lenders.244 “Predatory 
lending and unfair pricing often result in direct, as well as disparate, impacts on 
[M]inorities. Most often, it can take the form of reverse redlining and other 
discrimination after credit has already been extended.”245 This has created a 
segmented system of consumer finance in which higher-income consumers tend 
to be served by more highly regulated banks and thrifts, while lower-income and 
Minority customers become the primary customers of the unregulated ones.246 
And while payday loans in particular are typically marketed as short-term 
options to provide emergency capital, one study found that “[m]ost borrowers 
use payday loans to cover ordinary living expenses over the course of months, 
not unexpected emergencies over the course of weeks.”247 “Thus, high-risk, low-
income (and often [M]inority) borrowers disproportionately use payday loans to 
fill in the gaps left by the difference between their cost of living and income, and 
consistently roll over these loans.”248 In fact, payday lenders specifically target 
workers living paycheck-to-paycheck that are left to pay predatory interest rates 
that are on average twenty times higher than those of credit cards.249  
As Professor Abbye Atkinson argues, “talk about low-income Americans’ 
access to credit indicates that the balance in the public-private American welfare 
regime has shifted too far toward individualism and private provision.”250 
“Although one might expect that advocates of the market will continue to view 
credit as a viable tool of intertemporal redistribution, advocates of economic 
rights, poverty rights, and economic equality must begin to examine closely the 
 
 242 Elizabeth Warren, The Economics of Race: When Making It to the Middle Is Not Enough, 61 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 1777, 1797 (2004). 
 243 Engel & McCoy, supra note 241, at 1281. 
 244 Id. 
 245 Andrew Kuntz, Note, Sub-Prime Protection: The Inadequacies of the Federal Response to the 
Economic Crisis in Protecting Minorities from Predatory Lending, 13 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 219, 228 
(2011). 
 246 See Cassandra Jones Havard, Democratizing Credit: Examining the Structural Inequities of Subprime 
Lending, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 233, 261 (2006). 
 247 Abbye Atkinson, Rethinking Credit as Social Provision, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1093, 1107 (2019). 
 248 Id. at 1107–08.  
249 Yonathan A. Arbel, Payday, 98 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 4 (2020) (“A $300 loan can quickly balloon into 
thousands of dollars of outstanding debt, leading many borrowers to debt spirals that 
can culminate in deep financial distress and even bankruptcy.”).  
 250 Id. at 1158. 
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ideal of safe or low-interest credit as valid, universal social policy.”251 It would 
not be unprecedented for the government to play an active role in offering credit 
to low-income people. In the past, “the government has supported banks with a 
special mission of meeting the needs of the poor, such as credit unions, S&Ls, 
and Morris Banks.”252 In line with what was once its mission of sponsoring 
financial institutions to help give the poor access to small loans,253 the 
government could provide free credit restoration services to Minorities to 
improve their credit prospects. 
Existing private credit restoration companies are often problematic for a 
variety of reasons. For one, these services carry a high price tag, typically 
including a start-up fee and ongoing monthly costs.254 Many of these companies 
also make promises they cannot keep; the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau recently sued a credit repair company that had racked up $23 million in 
fees, all while not delivering on its promises to consumers.255 A supervised 
government service that will help restore credit history of minorities that 
maintain their tax payments schedule on time, for instance, can have a positive 
effect on such constituents ability to obtain future seed funding.  
D. The Role of Lawyers as Social Agents 
Running a business entails adhering to numerous regulations, acquiring 
licenses, and submitting informational filings.256 Many Minority entrepreneurs 
might not be aware of the extent of these bureaucratic hurdles until faced with 
administrative delays and overwhelming costs. Accordingly, the effects of 
asymmetric regulatory costs on Minority entrepreneurs are palpable.257 One way 
to decrease the impact of current legal rules and lending practices on Minorities 
is to ensure that they have a more predominant role in the rulemaking process.258 
This approach has been successfully implemented in fintech regulation, in which 
industry players come together to propose, discuss, and test technologies and 
 
 251 Id. at 1160. 
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 253 Id. at 486. 
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 256 See Timothy Dunne, Mark J. Roberts & Larry Samuelson, Patterns of Firm Entry and Exit in U.S. 
Manufacturing Industries, 19 RAND J. ECON. 495, 513 tbl.11 (1988) (demonstrating empirically on the effect of 
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financial services in banking without suffering the consequences of regulatory 
default.259 In a similar manner, minority entrepreneurs and their legal 
representatives should have “a seat at the regulator’s table” to opine on the effect 
certain rules might have on minority businesses.  
Another important aspect of reducing systemic biases is to acknowledge that 
lawyers play a major role in informing Minority entrepreneurs of administrative 
and regulatory requirements.260 One potential boundary for many lawyers in this 
area is that not all law students are exposed to critical legal theory during their 
law school careers. For example, future corporate lawyers are among the least 
likely to be engaged in critical legal theory in law school because business law 
courses rarely utilize it in their curriculum.261 Yet, lawyers’ interactions with 
their Minority clients provide them an opportunity to directly advance social 
justice within the practice of law.262 Socially responsible practitioners can serve 
as agents of change. Attorneys can play a central role in not only advising, but 
also educating Minority entrepreneurs about regulatory, financial, and legal 
opportunities to give them the same chance to succeed as other businesses.263 
Such legal advice is vital for under-resourced micro-entrepreneurs to avoid legal 
conflicts, build wealth, and realize economic empowerment.264 Activist legal 
counsels may also take on informing Minority entrepreneurs about opportunities 
for business expansion, scaling an enterprise, and building wealth and credit. 
Since such legal advice in the private legal market is usually quite expensive, 
it is necessary to make it more accessible to Minority entrepreneurs. Providing 
legal services programs specifically designated to Minority-entrepreneurs free 
of charge via the American Bar Association, local chambers of commerce, 
Student Bar Associations, or university clinics can make a big difference to 
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emergent entrepreneurs and established Minority-Owned Businesses. These 
agencies should recruit legal agents interested in taking an active role in 
promoting social justice by helping underrepresented and Minority 
entrepreneurs in their communities. They can help foster an innovative spirit and 
growth while dismantling the walls of systemic racism. University 
administrators and law school deans should proliferate entrepreneurship and 
transactional clinics and their essential services to underserved Minority 
entrepreneurial clients while cultivating students’ social responsibility and 
learning outcomes.265 These legal agents can contribute in a meaningful way to 
advancing Minorities’ economic empowerment, wealth equality, and social 
justice. 
CONCLUSION 
This Essay pointed to several systemic biases that contribute to the default 
of Minority entrepreneurs and exposed the degree to which they face an uneven 
playing field. It demonstrated that the asymmetrical distribution of regulatory 
costs falls more heavily on Minority-Owned Businesses. Minorities are at a 
disadvantage when trying to obtain capital or secure government set-asides. 
They experience lending biases as well as limited access to financial and social 
networks. While these problems are common to all entrepreneurs, they are 
exacerbated for Minority entrepreneurs, who the SBA report suffer from lower 
levels of education and managerial experience.266 
Entrepreneurship cannot, in and of itself, be the solution to narrowing the 
racial wealth and equity gap. Done correctly, entrepreneurship has immense 
potential to promote equity growth for Minority businesspersons. Improving the 
Minority entrepreneurial ecosystem is a step in the right direction for attaining 
economic justice and narrowing the racial wealth gap. Advancing public policy 
to promote Minority entrepreneurship and urban recovery is long overdue. 
Acknowledging the importance of Minority entrepreneurs and addressing their 
high compliance costs and tight credit problems can help achieve cultural 
objectives, such as supporting diversity and developing neighborhoods and 
urban areas, both of which are vital elements of social justice and equality. 
When the government promulgates rules and regulations, it has the ability to 
create winners and losers.267 Responsible regulators should routinely consider 
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other, more efficient methods to mitigate the impacts of regulations on 
Minorities in society. This Essay hopes to spur empirical research on how laws, 
rules, and procedures affect the cohort of Minority entrepreneurs to determine 
the degree to which the discriminatory asymmetries described here translate to 
their everyday business practices. Including more Minority entrepreneurs in the 
rulemaking process is another essential step. Forming inclusive Minority 
networks, as well as information cooperatives, incubators, and accelerators, can 
help defray some of the negative impacts of asymmetric costs. Lessening 
regulatory requirements and forming racial Minority capital growth programs 
are other ways to offset Minority biases. Further experimentation should explore 
the efficacy of such initiatives in narrowing the gaps in racial wealth and 
inequality. Lastly, cultivating the role of lawyers, practitioners, and students as 
social agents who can undertake advancing Minority entrepreneurs is of utmost 
importance in achieving a more equal and just free-enterprise system.268 
Promoting the well-being and success of Minority entrepreneurs will generate a 
stronger economy and a healthier society. 
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